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Summary  
 
In the early 1990s Russia embarked on the transition to a market economy, as an independent 
country but with institutions and other economic structures inherited from the Soviet Union. 
The combination of a regional differentiated industrial structure and lack of incentives for 
profitability has influenced Russia’s regional development in productivity. How the sectors 
and firms have adjusted to the market system and their ability to restructure varies, and this 
has had implications for the regional distribution of industrial productivity levels. 
 
In my thesis I have analyzed how relative productivity levels across the regions of Russia have 
developed during the period 1996–2004. As a measure on productivity level I have used 
labour productivity, defined as value added per worker employed in industry. I have focused 
on what has been traditionally regarded as the main Russian industries: oil and gas extraction, 
electricity production, mining and quarrying, together with manufacturing. The question I 
have tried to answer in my thesis is whether the regional productivity rates have converged or 
diverged during the period analyzed and how the observed pattern resonates with economic 
theory.  
 
To answer my questions I have applied an empirical method using regional data from 
Goskomstat, which is the issuing body of official statistics in Russia.  I have carried out 
convergence analysis to test for absolute and conditional convergence.  
 
In my analysis I have found support for conditional convergence predicted by the Solow- 
model and the technology-gap model by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), related to 
endogenous growth theory. Regional openness for trade and investment prove to be most 
important explaining the observed regional differences in growth rates.
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1. Introduction 
 
Industrial production in Russia has undergone major structural changes. The break-up of the 
Soviet Union led to a change in the economic environment. The economy went from being 
based on a command system to moving towards a market-based system. The communistic 
command system had involved central planning of industrial location and production plans. It 
is reasonable to expect that the dismantling of the lines of command and the introduction of 
market incentives have affected the industrial composition, the geographical structure and the 
distribution of industrial productivity. I will look at how the process of adjusting to market 
forces has led to convergence or divergence in labour productivity among the regions of 
Russia.  
 
The industrial structure in Russia by the end of the Soviet era was different from what 
normally occur in marked economies. Through central planning, industry was geographically 
decentralized, with mono-industrial towns scattered around the country (Maurseth 2006). 
Industrial development had high priority in the Soviet Union and many businesses were 
heavily subsidized. Low transport costs were an important tool to keep industry running in the 
periphery. As a result, at the start of the transition, Russia found itself with a higher share of 
employment in such industries relative to other countries at similar income levels (World 
Bank 2004), many of them located far away from the large markets. Since the communist 
system had encouraged production, not productivity, productivity differences at the end of the 
Soviet era were large.  
 
The main purpose of this study is to analyse how the regional distribution of productivity in 
Russia has developed under the conditions of a market economy. As a measure of productivity 
I will use labour productivity, defined as value added per worker employed in industry. The 
focus will be on what has been traditionally regarded as the main Russian industries: oil and 
gas extraction, electricity production, mining and quarrying, together with manufacturing. I 
will later refer to this sector simply as the ‘industry sector’. According to economic theory, 
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when opening up for market forces, investments will flow into the regions with the largest 
growth potential, and firms will adopt those technologies that maximize profit. Whether this 
will lead to convergence or divergence depends on the economic forces in action, as well as 
the regional specific characteristics. In economic theory there are two primary reasons for 
expecting convergence. First, there is the neoclassical argument, which holds that declining 
marginal productivity in capital tends to make the rate of return on investments higher in less 
productive regions. Second, according to the technology-gap argument, technologically less 
advanced regions are expected to have larger potential for technological improvements. Only 
equal regions are expected to converge to the same steady-state productivity level. If the 
regions differ with respect to business and investment climate, market access or resource 
endowments, then convergence is expected only when such differences are controlled for.  In 
the presence of geographical local economic externalities or economies of scale, such 
differences could prove to be a source of divergence, however. New growth theory 
emphasizes the role of history for regional growth potential and economic agglomeration. 
Decisions regarding industrial location taken under central planning can determine which 
regions are likely to become the productive leaders in a market economy.  
 
The combination of Russia’s enormous geographical area, large resource endowments and a 
highly regional diversified industrial structure inherited from the Soviet past, makes analysing 
regional convergence in productivity in Russia particularly interesting. Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (Ch. 11, 2004) argue that we are more likely to find convergence across regions than 
across countries, because, although differences in technology, preferences and institutions 
exist across regions, these differences are likely to be smaller than across countries. Russian 
regions share a set of legal, economic and political institutions; the population speak the same 
language and have a common socialist past. On the other hand, Russia’s regions are largely 
heterogeneous with respect to some economic factors, such as resource endowments, 
geographical location and market access and industrial structure, providing a unique 
opportunity to analyse them in light of the hypothesis of convergence.  
 
There exist few analyses of convergence within the industrial sector in Russia, but the general 
the empirical evidence from analyses of GRP (gross regional output) tends to support the 
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convergence hypothesis (Merkina 2004, Maurseth 2006, Nielsen 2005). However, the results 
are not unequivocal (see for example Maurseth 2003). The industrial sector diverges from the 
other sectors in the Russian economy, because of its central role in the Soviet economy. While 
the market services have to a greater degree developed during the transition, the industrial 
sector carries a significant inheritance from the Soviet past, one that cannot change over night. 
In this context it is interesting to see whether focusing solely on the industrial sector will 
matter for the results of convergence.  
 
Analysis of convergence in productivity has stressed the importance of industrial structure. 
Heterogeneous industrial structures across regions or countries could explain weak evidence 
of convergence. When differences in sectors are controlled for, a general finding is 
convergence. This could be relevant for Russia regarding the highly differentiated industrial 
structure and the strong position of resource intensive industry in some regions. Industries 
based on extraction and processing of natural recourse have attracted special attention in 
economic literature, because of the existence of large resource rents. Especially oil and gas 
production gives high value added per worker, but the high rents could also act to suppress 
incentives to invest in increased productivity in the long run. Possessing large resource 
endowments could be a blessing or a curse, depending on how they are utilized.  
  
To analyse the development of productivity in Russian industry I will do an empirical analysis 
based regional data from Goskomstat for the period 1996 to 2004. I will test whether the 
regions have converged with respect to labour productivity over that period. Since only 
conditional convergence is expected I will control for regionally specific variables, such as 
investment in human and physical capital, population growth, migration, openness for foreign 
and initial industrial structure, with special emphasis on the natural resource sector. In 
addition I include an indicator reflecting regional market access, to see if there are any 
tendencies to economic agglomeration in the economy. In Chapter 1 I describe the political 
and economic climate in Russia in general, together with the Russian industry. In chapter 2 I 
explain the theory framework that underlies the empirical analysis. Chapter 3 presents a 
description of the Russian regions with respect to the core economic variables in the analysis, 
whereas Chapter 4 offers the empirical analysis and regression results. 
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2.  Political and economic background 
 
In the early 1990s Russia embarked on the transition to a market economy, as an independent 
country but with institutions and other economic structures inherited from the Soviet Union. 
The combination of a diversified industrial structure and lack of incentives for profitability 
has influenced Russia’s regional development in productivity. How the sectors and firms have 
adjusted to the market system and their ability to restructure varies, and this has had 
implications for the regional distribution of industrial productivity levels. 
  
2.1 The inheritance from the Soviet Union 
By the end of 1991 the dissolution of the USSR was a fact. The underlying causes include an 
impaired state, a worn-out economy and increasing demands for independence among the 
Union’s republics. A bankrupt and discord state could not prevent the movement of 
breakaway states. Effort to save the Union only accelerated the process.  
 
Even though it is difficult to get an accurate measure of economic performance in the Soviet 
era, statistics indicate that the Soviet Union initially managed to maintain an impressive 
growth through capital accumulation, but during the 1970s and 80s the growth rate began 
slowing down and the development in productivity was actually negative. Even the industries 
of priority interest, such as steel, coal and petroleum production, experienced negative growth 
rates in factor productivity from the mid-70s (Gregory and Stuart 1986). The main reasons 
were lack of incentives to improve efficiency, a system incapable of restructuring, unbalanced 
priority to certain industries (like those connected to the military) and deteriorating terms of 
trade. 
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Much of the growth potential through increased use of inputs was exhausted by the end of 
Stalin’s time. Large investments in capital were no longer as profitable. It became increasingly 
more difficult to substitute capital for labour. Major decisions regarding investments, 
production targets and price setting were taken in Moscow, which created massive problems 
of asymmetric information and monitoring. Attempts to reform the system toward higher 
productivity failed (Sutela 2003). Managers had no incentives for considering cost efficiency 
or investing in innovative activity: they were rewarded primarily for achieving pre-determined 
output targets (Gregory and Stuart 1986). The uniform production policy, focusing on 
production quantity, led to diversified productivity rates, large waste of resources and 
environmental stress.  
 
Much Soviet investment, including R&D investment, went to the military sector or related 
activities. To achieve parity with US military forces, the production focus was increasingly 
directed towards heavy industry and the military industry. As a result, other goods, such as 
consumer goods, had relatively low quality and were not competitive. Soviets exports were 
heavily oil-dependent, so when oil production fell in the enormous oilfields in west Siberia, 
the Soviet Union had to take up loans from the West to finance necessary imports of 
consumer goods and new technology. By the time Gorbachev took over, the economy was in 
bad shape. 
2.2 Russia towards the market  
The transformation started under Gorbachev as an attempt to revitalize the Soviet economy, 
through the reforms collectively known as perestroika, which began in 1985. They included 
cautious attempts at privatization and marketization of the economy. However, with lack of 
real incentives and soft budget constraints, combined with increasing political support for the 
disintegration of the USSR, the attempts failed. Before the planned reforms could be fulfilled, 
the Soviet Union collapsed, and with support from Western economists a more extensive 
reform programme was developed. This reform was intended to ensure that there would be no 
return to a planned economy, by creating a new generation of capitalists. The basic elements 
were price and trade liberalization, privatization and fiscal stabilization.  
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Shock therapy 
Implementation of the reform was meant to be quick – to utilize the ‘window of opportunity’. 
The argument was that with time the old machinery of power could gain enough strength to 
hamper the reforms. A further argument was that rapid implementation would reduce the 
opportunities for insiders to exploit the reform for their own gains. On January 1992 the 
implementation of transition policies started, with abolishing the system of fixed prices. 
Approximately 90% of retail and 80% of producer prices were freed (Ahrend and Tompson 
2005). Over the following years, state enterprises became privatized. Most enterprises were 
privatized during the first great privatization wave in 1993/94, except for some highly 
valuable and key sectors like the extraction industries. These were to a large extent taken over 
by private owners, often referred to as ‘oligarchs’, during ‘the loan for share’ process prior to 
the presidential election in 1996. On the whole, by the beginning of 1997 much of the 
privatization process had been accomplished and private enterprises now accounted for a large 
part of industrial output. 
 
Crisis and criminals 
The transition was marred by great problems. Falling demand and loss of old markets put 
great challenges on an inexperienced industrial management. The power vacuum following 
the collapse of the old system created room for rent seeking and fraudulent economic 
behaviour. With weak financial policy performance, the consequences were rapid inflation, 
falling production and investments, together with a criminalization of the economy.  
 
Growth rates had already been diminishing, but with the collapse of the Union they turned 
negative. GDP fell by no less than 40 percentage points during the transition until the financial 
crisis of 1998. In comparison, the US economy had shrunk by 30% under the Great 
Depression of the 1930s (ECE 2004). Russia’s transformation cost far more than expected – 
the ability of the economy to adjust and the government to create a stable political 
development had been overestimated. When the old commando and supply lines were 
dissolved, trust and experience had to be established with the new market-based system. It 
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was believed that the reform would create a new class of capitalists, which would develop and 
make Russian industry profitable.  
 
In reality, firms ended up in the hands of a few insiders, who used their newly acquired assets 
for private short-term gain. Abuse of position and fraudulent behaviour had existed during the 
Soviet period, but went out of control under the power vacuum that ensued with the demise of 
the old system. The uncertain political and economic climate gave few incentives for long-
term investments. At least a fourth of all businessmen were linked to the criminal underworld, 
according to Moscow region policy chief Alexander Kulikov (Sakwa 2002). Lacking 
resources, the government was simply not able to protect the newly-established property 
rights. Security companies emerged as big business for businessmen who needed protection 
against other criminals. 
 
Price liberalization led to massive inflation, when firms lacked incentives to respond by 
increased supply. The industrial structure inherited from the Soviet era was a largely 
monopolistic one. Up to one third of all industrial enterprises were monopolies, producing 
goods that no one else in the USSR did (Sakwa 2002). In the absence of competition, and with 
an uncertain investment climate, it was more profitable to meet excess demand with increased 
prices rather than investing in production. Indeed, inflation did fall after the first shock, but 
loose monetary policy intended to finance the government’s massive budget deficits made it 
surge again (Ahrend and Tompson 2005). Inflation started to decline only after the 
government and the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) introduced a more stringent monetary 
policy in 1993. By 1996 it was basically under control.  
 
Lack of security for property rights and an inadequate banking system contributed to the 
plummeting investment rate during the 1990s. The absolute level of investments fell by 
around 75% for 1990–2000 (Sakwa 2002). Since the banking system mostly financed inside 
businesses, investment credits had to come from the firms themselves. 
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Indicators Russian 
economy 
 % of previous year 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Growth in real GDP –5 –14.5 –8.7 –12.7 –4.1 –4.9 
Growth in real industrial 
production 
–8 –18 –14 –21 –3 –4 
Growth in real capital 
investments 
–15 –40 –12 –24 –10 –18 
Consumer price index 260 2609 940 315 231 122 
Industrial price index 340 3380 1000 330 270 125.6 
 
Table 2.1: Indicators of the Russian economy. Source: Goskomstat 
 
After some years of more stringent monetary policy and with the re-election of Yeltsin, the 
economy seem to start stabilize. Before the collapse in 1998, economic prospects looked 
brighter for a while. But then, on 13 August 1998, the Russian stock, bond, and currency 
markets collapsed as a result of investor fears that the government would devaluate the rouble 
and default on domestic debt. It had now become clear that the Russian government no longer 
could finance its deficit through further loans.  
 
Post-crisis Russia and the Putin era  
The financial crisis proved short-lived and had a relatively modest impact on GDP. The sharp 
devaluation of the rouble served to boost competitiveness in Russian industry. The Russian 
economy had reached its bottom line. When the new millennium began there was some 
evidence that production was becoming more profitable than asset-stripping, and by 2001 the 
World Bank could take Russia off the ‘crisis list’ (Sakwa 2002). 
 
The crisis had reduced political resistance to the necessary economic reforms. In the wake of 
the 1998 crisis, steps were taken to bring the governmental budget under control. Massive cuts 
in public spending were carried out, including reduced industrial subsidises and social 
transfers. In 2000 Vladimir Putin took over at the helm, and with him came increasing 
economic and political stability that continued throughout his presidency. The explanation for 
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this success can be found in the combination of the ‘Putin effect’ and the political and 
economic reforms carried out under him, as well as a range of favourable external factors.  
 
Putin came to power at a time when the Russian economy had just started its recovery after 
the financial crisis: the crude oil price was increasing and the sharp rouble devaluation had 
boosted industrial competitiveness. The rouble was devaluated in the mid-90s as well without 
the same effect on competitiveness, but by 1998 the reformation of the Russian economy had 
been accomplished sufficiently for the economy to react to market signals. Better terms of 
trade were met with increased production.  
 
With increasing oil prices, Russia has experienced a large trade surplus, a factor vital for relief 
of its foreign debt.  The election of president Putin gave further confirmation against a 
reversal of property rights. Under him the work of combating economic crime and improving 
the investment climate started. One of the steps is the de-bureaucratization reform aimed at 
simplifying and streamlining the procedures for registering new businesses. Initially the effect 
was positive and the administrative burden on firms was reduced, but this progress seemed to 
stagnate towards 2003 (CEFIR 2003). A reform widely considered as the most important one 
is the tax reform. Simplifying the tax system, broadening the taxation base and reducing 
marginal tax rates served to boost incentives for investment as well as federal tax revenues. 
The reforms have lessened regional legislative differences and the possibilities for local 
interpretations of the rules, although tax rates and regional investment climates still differ.  
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2.3 Regional politics  
Soviet-era regional policies –‘the conquest of the North’  
The Soviet government had a clear strategy for spreading the production to new regions and 
small towns. Specific regions and towns were singled out as industrial locations. Many urban 
areas, especially in the North, arose as a result of central planning.  Soviet mythology 
presented the North as the land of the future, an area which was to be ‘conquered’ (Blakkisrud 
2006). The North,1 including Siberia and the Far East, was endowed with many of the natural 
resources vital to industry.  
 
The rapid industrialization that commenced with the first Soviet Five-Year Plan, in the late 
1920s, brought with it the need for natural resources like coal, oil and heavy metals (ibid.). 
This meant the start of the industrial policies for the North and Far-Eastern regions, so richly 
endowed with natural resources. The eastward orientation was reinforced by the wartime 
evacuation of hundreds of factories were evacuated, to protect them from the Nazis.  
 
To exploit the natural resources in the North labour, which was initially scarce in these areas, 
was needed. Under Stalin came the forced reallocation of labour. Through the Gulag system 
millions of people were moved to work in the North. After the death of Stalin, this system was 
gradually closed down and replaced by a set of social and economic incentive schemes, 
known as ‘Northern benefits’. To sustain this scattered industrial structure, transport costs 
were kept artificially low. These policies promoted a relatively higher production and 
population density in higher latitudes than would probably be the case under a market system.  
 
 
                                             
1
 For a definition the Russian North see Blakkisrud and Hønneland (2006), pp. 8–9. For which regions are regarded as 
included in the Russian North or partly included see appendix chapter 3: Regions. 
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Fragmentation and integration 
Under the planned economy, the regional economy was basically a constituent part of the 
national economy. Production, consumption and investments were determined not by regional 
demand, but by state plan and the policies of federal departments. The centre exercised strict 
control over regional income flows (Granberg 2000). Even though the Soviet constitution 
granted to the republics certain rights of sovereignty, in practice these were highly 
circumscribed (Ross 2002). 
 
Legal and economic fragmentation of the Russian Federation arose after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Dispersion of the systems for economic interaction together with a weak centre 
led to regional separatism. Many regions took advantage of the weakness of the federal centre 
under Yeltsin to size powers and control over regional resources. Tragically, many of the new 
regional institutions were forged by local authoritarian leaders who emerged out of the old 
Soviet nomenklatura (ibid.). The struggle for power has also led to an inward focus, and 
building up new trade lines has not enjoyed high priority. Inter-regional trade as a part of GNP 
fell from 22% to approximately 12–13% in the period 1990 to 2000 (Granberg 2000). 
 
In the 1993 Constitution the rights of the federal units are equalized and made subject to the 
law and decisions of the federal authorities (Sakwa 2002). All the same, many regions have 
continued to pass and enforce regional laws, many of them inconsistent with federal 
legislation. This has had consequences for regional practice regarding the liberalization and 
privatization reform. Some regions have refrained from privatizing their industries and have 
refused to implement legislation concerning privatization of land. In conflict with the centre, 
withholding taxes was used as a tool for blackmailing the federal authorities. By the end of 
Yeltsin’s period, the regional executive heads were running their federal subjects as personal 
fiefdoms (Sakwa 2000).  
 
Putin’s primary object has been to tighten federal control of the regions and create a unified 
economic and legal space. To achieve this and monitor the process, his first move was to 
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divide the country into seven super-districts, to supervise that regional legislation is in 
accordance with federal law. Putin’s efforts to bring regional legislation in line with the 1993 
Constitution and federal statues have showed results. The work of simplifying the bureaucracy 
and the tax system has also helped to strengthen the centre/ periphery relationship. Today’s 
Russia has, to greater extent, become a unified legal space and an integrated national market. 
2.4 Industry under transition 
By the end of the Soviet era, Russia was highly industrialized and served the other FSC-
countries (Former Soviet Countries) with manufacturing and engineering products, together 
with petroleum products. Mechanical engineering, food and light industry were the three 
largest industries (Granberg 2000). Petroleums products were  the most important export 
article, and were crcucial for the trade with countries outside the Soviet Union. The transition 
led to major structural changes in the composition of industry, on national and regional levels. 
The economy moved towards being more based on resource industries, especially oil and gas 
production. Especially hard hit was the manufacturing industry, together with mechanical 
engineering, chemical and forest industries. Important factors here were falling national 
demand, loss of international competitive ability and cutbacks in state subsidies. Faced with 
increased competition, industry had problems undertaking the necessary adjustments. With the 
dismantling of the rouble zone, old supply lines ceased to exists. Russian products faced 
competition problems when the CIS countries opened towards the West. According to OECD 
(1995) calculations, the disruption of the trade with CIS countries contributed to 10% of 
Russia’s economic decline in the early 1990s. 
 
Since 1998 the pace of structural change has slowed down, and part of the manufacturing 
industry has begun to catch up again. Intra-sectoral change has become an increasingly 
important source of productivity growth. With the devaluation of the rouble, Russian industry 
became more competitive on the international market. Although many firms increased 
production by utilizing existing input, those firms that managed to actively restructure also 
increased their employment. Especially after 2002, the easy gains from the devaluation 
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became exhausted and the firms that had increased productivity managed to do so through 
active restructuring (Ahrend 2004). 
 
2.5 Regional differences 
With respect to the mono-industrial pattern across regions, the introduction of the market 
mechanism had varying regional consequences. Those regions that inherited the ‘wrong’ 
industries experienced huge losses. Granberg (2000) has identified three especially vulnerable 
types of regions: those with high concentration of manufacturing industry, peripheral regions, 
and those dependent on federal transfers. Among the latter, regions or centres based on 
military industry found themselves in a particularly difficult situation during the transition. 
Northern peripheral regions without large reserves of natural resources were hit especially 
hard. The industrialization of this area had been to some extent policy-dictated and did not 
reflect real economic costs. Transportation costs rose during the transition, and many Northern 
enterprises started running at huge losses. The winners were the regions endowed with oil, 
gas, non-ferrous metals and diamonds, and nodal centres. (See Blakkisrud 2006.) 
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3. Theories of regional development 
 
How will the distribution of productivity rates develop when the economy is transformed into 
a market economy? According to economic theory, with the opening up for market forces, 
investments will flow into regions with the largest growth potential, and firms will adopt 
technologies that serve to maximize profit. These mechanisms are expected to lead to 
convergence, for two reasons: decreasing marginal factor productivity, and the transfer of 
technology from regions at the productivity (technology) frontier to relatively less productive 
regions, which have greater potential to improve their productivity through investing in 
technology. In the absence of one or both of these assumptions, economic agglomeration and 
divergence may emerge. In the case of Russia, geography and initial industrial structure, 
including the country’s large resource industry, may obstruct the results of convergence.  
 
The hypothesis of convergence originates from neoclassical growth models in the tradition of 
Solow (1956), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). The models aim to explain growth 
dynamics in a period of transition, while long-term growth rates are taken as given. The 
central mechanism is decreasing return to capital, which leads regions to converge towards a 
common long-term growth rate of labour productivity. More recently, inspired by endogenous 
growth theory, convergence has been applied to the hypothesis of technological catch-up. 
Through transfer of technology from the most productive and innovative regions, regions 
lagging behind are expected to catch up. In the tradition of New Growht Theory (NGT) Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1997) have derived a formal model describing these mechanisms.  
 
If the technological spillovers are geographically restricted or tied to certain sectors, the result 
could be economic agglomeration instead. Geographical distance may act as a barrier – if, for 
example, transport costs are significantly high. Even though transport costs in Russia have 
been held artificially low, they have been rising during the transition. Krugman (1991) 
presents a model describing a source of agglomeration working through the size of the market. 
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Regional differences in industrial structure could act as a barrier to technological spillovers 
across regions. If some sectors have greater growth potential than others, this could lead to 
different steady-states or even disrupt the result of convergence. The dependence on resource-
related industries in Russian economy makes it relevant to consider this sector in particular. 
The above discussion forms my theory basis. In the following, I present the central theories in 
more detail in light of the hypothesis of convergence. 
 
3.1 Neoclassical growth theory 
In the original Solow model there are two factors in production, capital (K) and labour (L). 
Increased output per capita (y) comes through an increase in the capital/labour ratio ( L
Kk = ) 
and technological progress (x). Since the Solow model assumes full employment, output per 
capita is equivalent to production per employed labour and is proportional to labour 
productivity as I measure it. Because the model assumes decreasing marginal productivity of 
the factors in production, increases in per capita output through investment in capital are only 
transitory, and diminish as the economy approaches its steady-state capital/labour ratio. In 
steady-state, investments in increased capital/labour ratio do not increase productivity, and the 
only source of growth is the exogenous rate of technological progress. Assuming that 
technology is a public good, all regions will have access to the same type of technology, and 
thereby grow at the same long-term growth rate. Diverging growth rates are explained by 
differences in the regional possibilities to grow through investing in increased k, which 
depends on how far the regions are from the steady-state level of productivity. From the two 
central equations in the model, we can derive the growth dynamics in production per capita. 
Equation 3.1) is the production function measured in output per effective amount of labour 
( ( )t
t
t AL
Y
y =ˆ ), while equation 3.2) depicts the growth in the ratio of capital per effective 
amount of labour ( AL
Kk =ˆ ) over time.  
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The model is dynamic, so all the variables are a function of time. The production function has 
the properties of positive but decreasing marginal productivity in inputs and exhibit constant 
return to scale. n stands for the growth in the workforce, s the saving rate and  the rate of 
capital depreciation. A(t) is defined as labour-augmenting technology, growing at a constant 
rate x. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, Ch.1) have shown that only labour-augmenting 
technological progress (A), defined to hold the effective relative input shares constant, is 
consistent with the existence of a steady-state in general. The steady-state is then defined by a 
fixed ratio of capital and output per effective unit of labour ( *ˆk , ∗yˆ ). In steady-state growth, kˆ  
is zero ( 0ˆ =∗k ) and since yˆ  only is growing in kˆ , growth in output per effective amount of 
labour 0ˆ =∗y . Assuming constant elasticity of production in the inputs, the production 
function can be expressed in a Cobb-Douglas functional form2. For this functional form the 
character of the technological progress is unimportant for the result and labour-augmenting 
technological progress could also be intepreted as growth in total factor productivity (TFP).  
The steady-state level of kˆ and yˆ is then characterized by equation 3.3) and 3.4)  respectively, 
where  is the elasticity of production in capital.  
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2Cobb-Douglas production function with constant return to scale retains the characteristics of the Solow model. 
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Using equation 3.3) to substitute for s in equation 3.2) we get an expression for 
k
kˆ
 as a 
function of ∗kˆ , given by equation 3.5). 
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We see that the growth in the rate of capital depends on the ratio
∗k
k
ˆ
ˆ
.  The rate of growth in 
output (
y
y
ˆ
ˆ
) is in a -proportion to the growth in
k
kˆ
 . Therefore we can use equation 3.5) and 
substitute yˆ for kˆ  from the production function to find an expression for 
y
y
ˆ
ˆ
 as a function of 
yˆ
 and ∗yˆ . The expression is depicted in as in equation 3.6). 
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Since  is defined as less than 1, from equations 3.5) and 3.6), we see that the growth rates 
decrease as kˆ  and yˆ increase and approach their steady-state levels. An approximate for the 
rate of convergence in the neighbourhood of steady-state can be found from a log linearization 
of equation 3.5) or 3.6). Using equation 3.6) gives us equation 3.7), where  is an approximate 
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of the convergence coefficient, measuring how much the growth rate declines with a 
proportional increase in output.  
 
3.7) [ ]∗−−= yyy
y
ˆlnˆln
ˆ
ˆ β
    
( )αδβ −++= 1)( nx
 
 
 approximately measures the speed of convergence in the nearby steady-state. Equation 3.7) 
is used as a starting point when testing for convergence. When yˆ  equal yˆ * 
 
then y
y
ˆ
ˆ
= 0 and 
the capital/labour ratio (k) and output per capita (y) will grow at a rate equal to the rate of 
technological progress (x).  
 
The Solow-model assumes a perfectly competitive world, where the marginal returns to the 
factors of production are equalized across states.  In the Cobb-Douglas example this implies 
that all sectors have the same technology parameter . Any differences in steady-states in the 
original Solow model are due to differences in the consumers’ time preferences, growth in the 
workforce or the rate of depreciation3.  
 
The Solow model has since been augmented to provide a better fit with observed patterns. 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) show that when human capital is included, the explanatory 
power of the model increases significantly. The implication for the result just derived is that 
steady-states also are characterized by the rate of investment in human capital and that the 
expression of  now also depends on the elasticity of human capital in production.  
 
                                             
3
 The saving rate is exogenous in the Solow model. Cass (1965) and Koopman (1965) have endogenized the saving 
behaviour, but the main results remain. 
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3.2 Catching up in technology and the role of spillovers 
Endogenous growth theory has been developed to describe observed differences in long-term 
growth rates. The theory tries to explain factors underlying different long-run growth paths, or 
the absence of such. The literature provides a range of new explanations for various steady-
states and opens for differences in the long-term growth paths. In a tradition initiated by 
Romer (1987, 1990), and extended by Aghion and Howitt (1992) among others, long-run 
growth is explained by technological progress through innovation of new intermediate 
products. Productivity in the final goods sector is assumed to grow in input variety. 
Differences in steady-states are explained by differences in regional policies encouraging own 
research and development (R&D), but also openness to other markets. The latter is important, 
since trade gives access to new products, innovated in other regions and countries. Through 
giving increased access to variety of inputs trade has a positive impact on the productivity of a 
region.  
 
Technological diffusion plays a key role in whether laggard regions tend to catch up or not. 
The ‘catch-up’ argument, developed by Gerschenkron (1962), Abramovitz (1986) and others, 
emphasizes the distance to the technology frontier for the scope of imitation. Countries behind 
the innovation frontier, it is argued, can grow faster by coping technologies already developed 
in technologically more advanced countries (Fagerberg 1995). In his famous paper from 1962, 
‘Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective’, Gerschenkron argued that relatively 
backward economies such as Germany, France and Russia would manage to catch up by 
adopting frontier technology during the 19th century.  
 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) formalize this argument in a model where the relative cost 
advantage to be gained from imitating desirable technology serves as a mechanism for 
convergence. Based on the framework for technological progress of Romer (1990), they 
describe the transitory dynamics.  In this model, productivity growth is a result of an increase 
  
20 
in the variety of new intermediate products4 available for the final goods sector. Increased 
variety can be seen as providing greater opportunities for specialization, thereby boosting 
labour productivity. Alternatively new technology could be incorporated in new product, such 
that technological progress is achieved only through use of new products.  
 
New products may be the result of own innovation effort, or they could become available 
through trade with other regions that are also inventing new products. Since imitating is 
usually cheaper, a region lagging behind the technology frontier will tend to choose this 
strategy. At the frontier there are simply no products to imitate. The cost advantages makes it 
possible for the laggard regions to grow faster than the frontier regions, but only for a period, 
while the cost of imitating is assumed to increase when the regions are approaching the 
technological level at the frontier. The decreasing cost advantage plays the same role in this 
model as decreasing marginal return on capital in the Solow-model. A reason for the cost to 
be increasing, when the region get more technological advanced is that the cheapest and easily 
accessible technology is adopted first. The lagging region has incentives to imitate as long as 
the cost of doing so (v2) is lower than its cost of innovating (2).  
 
The cost advantage increases with distance to the frontier, measured by the ratio of 
intermediate products (
1
2
N
N
) available in the laggard region (region 2) to the number of 
intermediates available in the region at the technological frontier (region 1). The regions are 
assumed share production functions, but differ in productivity parameters, Ai, and initial 
number of goods available, Ni, i=1,2. Assuming the production function of a Spence 
(1976)/Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) type, relative productivity (
1
2
y
y
) in the two countries can be 
described as a function of the relative technological parameter (
1
2
A
A
) and the relative 
                                             
4
 Growth through increased variety of new products is based on the product variety theory of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
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availability of intermediates (
1
2
N
N
) as described in equation 3.8). The cost of imitating (v2) 
could be described as an increasing function of 
1
2
N
N given by equation 3.9).  
3.8) 
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The dynamics in the model works through the development of the variety ratio
1
2ˆ
N
NN = over 
time, and steady-state ( ∗
∗






2
1
2
,v
N
N ) is characterized by 0ˆ =N  and 02 =v  . We see that the 
model predicts conditional convergence, were productivity in steady-state depends on 
1
2
A
A
 and 
the steady-state value of
1
2
N
N (
∗






1
2
N
N ).  
 
1
2
A
A
 can be interpreted as the regions technological capacity and is reflecting different 
regional policies and institutions decisive for the regions’ relative productivity potential or 
technological capacity. Regional trade policies or policies securing a good business and 
investment climate are examples of such.  The steady-state variety ratio
∗






1
2
N
N
depends on the 
relative cost advantage in imitating and the laggard regions (region 2) initial productivity 
(productivity potential). Initial productivity in the regions is important for the innovators’ 
profitability, since the demand for new intermediate is increasing in the productivity of the 
final good sector. Initial productivity depends on the market size ( 2L ) and the region’s 
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technological capability in utilizing new technology ( 2A ). Since imitating also requires a 
certain amount of investments, initial profitability is important for the regions ability to 
finance new technology, which could get them out of the productivity backyard. If the region 
is not able to finance imitation of excising technology necessary to outpace the growth of the 
frontier region there will be no convergence. 
 
If the cost advantage is strong enough and the laggard regions is sufficiently productive 
initially, the laggard country will be able to adopt new products at a more rapid rate than 
country 1, but the rate of imitation will slow down as the technology gap diminish and the cost 
of imitation cost rises. If Nˆ reaches zero before v2 = 2, then country 2) will remain an imitator 
and 
1
2
N
N
will tend to remain less than one in steady-state.  
 
In steady-state the regions are assumed to grow at the same rate equal the growth rate of new 
innovations (1). Ceteris paribus, we see from equation 3.8) that region 2 will contain to have 
a lower rate of productivity. The model is similar to the neoclassical Solow model in that the 
driving force is decreasing returns (here to adopting technology), and that the countries are 
expected to converge to the same long-term growth rate. The main difference is that the 
process of catch-up is by no means automatic. If the investment devoted to imitation is not 
sufficiently high, growth in new products through imitation will be lower than the growth 
through innovation in the frontier region. In the model this can appear as a too low A2, or it 
could be the case if the marginal return to new products is relatively low.  
 
Another characteristic of the catch-up story is that the range of different factors determining 
possible regional specific steady-states is far more complex than in the neoclassical model. In 
addition to the economic factors like investments in physical and human capital, so important 
in the neoclassical approach, social and institutional factors are crucial to the outcome. In the 
technology-gap literature, the concept of ‘social capability’, used by Abramovitz (1986) 
among others, has been used to describe a region’s ability to catch up. Important factors here 
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may include the interaction of financial institutions able to handle large-scale investments, a 
stable political climate, a relatively competent workforce and openness to trade.  
 
Whether regions that start out with less advanced and less productive technology will 
converge to the innovative frontier depends on the nature of the technological spillovers 
involved. The Barro and Sala-i-Martin model do not geographically restrict the externalities, 
but such an effect of increasing cost of imitation with distance could be caught up in the 
technological capability parameter A. Thus longer a region is from the frontier thus smaller 
A.Local externalities and regional heterogeneity in production structure are likely to give rise 
to economic clusters and economic agglomeration.   
 
3.3 Market access and economic agglomeration 
In a market economy, profitability determines where the firm chooses to locate. Here, local 
externalities and/or the size of the market may be important determinants. Externalities linked 
to the local amount of human or physical capital and/or the number of firms in the market will 
increase the profitability of being located in that area. Examples of such externalities are 
learning effects from production or investments in local, which boosts the general 
technological competence of the local workforce or pecuniary externalities, which are 
externalities working through the market. The latter argument has been formally developed by 
Krugman among others (Krugman 1991, Krugman and Venables 1990). The central point in 
this theory of agglomeration is that the industries with economies of scale in production have 
incentives to locate in proximity to the relatively larger markets in presence of trade cost.  
 
Given the existence of economies of scale, the firms will face a trade-off between being able 
to make use off gains from being located in one market and the loss from trade costs. If the 
trade cost (eq. transport cost) is relatively large the firms will find it more profitable to be 
located in ‘both’ markets. At the other hand if the trade costs are sufficient low location does 
not matter. For an intermediate level of trade costs, being located in the largest market is for a 
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firm most profitable. This is just a part of the story. In addition the market size is increasing in 
the number of firms located there, which increases the profitability of the location. It is the 
interaction between these factors that drives the agglomeration dynamics.  
 
The market could increase in number of firms, because the goods produced by one firm are 
used as intermediates in production by other firms, as in the model by Krugman and Venables 
(1990). Another ‘centripetal’ force, as emphasized in Krugman’s core-periphery model, is 
migration (Krugman 1991). Number of firms located in a market will tend to increase the 
goods available. In existence of trade costs will the market with a relatively larger number of 
firms offer a relatively larger amount of goods to a lower price. The availability of relatively 
cheaper goods gives people incentives to migrate to the relatively larger market. Number of 
people moving to a market increases the demand facing the firms, such that the firms located 
there by utilizing the economies of scale, become even more productive. Several firms find it 
then profitable to move to the center.  
 
The centripetal forces in Krugman’s core-periphery model, and as well the model by Krugman 
and Venables (1990), are likely to give a geographical pattern with one or several economic 
cores, characterized by relatively higher productivity level and growth, spread over the 
country. According to these model and related theories, we will expect to see a positive 
impact from an indicator on market access. 
 
In Russia the transport costs were kept artificial low to sustain a peripheral and disperse 
production structure. During the transition the transport costs have increased substantial, 
although still low compared to in other countries. Having initially larger markets could then 
have been, according to Krugman’s core-periphery and related models, an advantageous for 
Russian regions during the transition, when the transport cost started increasing. At the other 
hand other trade costs has decreased, at least in the recent years as a result of Putin’s effort to 
unify the Russian national market. 
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3.4 Trade, industrial structure and the resource curse 
Regional structure, has in the tradition of new trade theory, been emphasized as important for 
the result of convergence. This literature departs from the traditional trade theories, were 
specializing in the sectors in which the region has comparative advantage can only yield gains. 
In the theory analyzing dynamic comparative advantage advantages in an industry can be 
developed through experience, such that history matters. Since different sectors may hold 
different growth potential, building up comparative advantage and specializing in the ‘wrong’ 
industries may reduce a region’s growth prospects. The regions happened to specialize in 
dynamic industries with large growth potential will at the other hand outgrow other regions.  
In this context the resource sector has attracted special interest, because of the large resource 
rents. These rents could generate adverse incentives and/or suppress other productive sectors. 
Growth prospects in a sector could be determined by access to sector specific factors, market 
potential or potential for technological growth.   
 
The industrial structure in Russia is marked by the central planning of the past, and industrial 
location has been less connected to regional comparative advantages and profitability 
considerations. The result of this central planning was mono industrial clusters geographically 
scattered around the country. According to Krugman’s core/periphery models, this is now 
likely to change. On the other hand, Russia’s regions could have gained experience in the 
sectors and in that way developed a kind of comparative advantage in production, which could 
counteract such centripetal forces working in the core/periphery models (Krugman 1991, 
Krugman and Venables 1990).   
 
The resource sector constitutes most of Russia’s export, which have given rise to concern for 
two reasons. First the large resource gains can suppress dynamic gains because of reduced 
incentives to invest in long term productivity gains. Second large oil and gas export may lead 
to appreciation of the Rubble, which remove other sectors from their competitiveness.  
Possessing large resource endowments may therefore be either a blessing or a curse. Empirical 
findings show that economies with an abundance of natural resources tend to grow more 
slowly than those without (Sachs and Warner 1997). The argument is that the large resource 
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rents spur a kind of rent-seeking behaviour among entrepreneurs and politicians, and that the 
resource sector over time could suppress other productive sectors. Mehlum, Moene and 
Torvik (2002) argue that whether this is the outcome depends on the quality of the institutions 
that govern the economy. ‘Producer-friendly’ institutions may manage to take advantage of 
the resource gains. The rents could invest in subjects increasing productivity of other sectors, 
yielding long-term gains. A productive resource industry could also stimulate demand in the 
manufacturing industries and/or be a supplier of intermediates to the final producers, as has 
been found to be the case in Russia (Bradshaw 2006).   
 
3.5 WHAT KIND OF CONVERGENCE? 
Convergence is a transitory phenomenon, describing the growth dynamics towards regional 
specific steady-states. Both the neoclassical and catch up theory, like that derived by Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1997), predict conditional convergence. In the traditional neoclassical 
approach, the steady-state was characterized by a few factors representing the consumers’ time 
preferences, growth in the workforce and the rate of capital depreciation. One branch of 
theories has aimed to describe the plurality of characteristics of different steady-states. 
Inspired by endogenous growth theory, a whole string of factors has been included in 
convergence analysis. Only in the case of equal regions, in the sense of common steady-states, 
is convergence expected. It could be argued that absolute convergence is more likely to occur 
across regions than across countries, because the former share a set of legal, economic and 
political institutions as well as language, a set of cultural codes and, in the case of Russia, a 
common socialist past. On the other hand, however, we should note that Russia’s regions 
differ considerably in terms of geography, climate and industrial structure.   
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4. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Russia is the largest country in the world, its 17.1 million km2 covering almost half the 
Northern hemisphere and, extending from China and Japan in the east to Western Europe. It 
can boast an enormous variety of landforms and landscapes: arctic deserts in the extreme 
north, tundra and large forest zones covering about half of the country, as well as the fertile 
areas in central European Russia, bordering on Ukraine and Belarus. This gives large variation 
in natural resource endowment, as well as in climate and communication possibilities.  In 
addition, the highly diversified industry, much of it off-centre, makes Russia unique, and 
constitutes a natural starting point for examining the regional differences in productivity 
growth.  
 
4.1 Russian regions 
Today Russia consists of 83 regions, divided into five categorises: oblast, republic, krai, okrug 
and federal cities. (See Fig. 4.1) These subjects have differing degrees of autonomy. Oblast is 
the most common form of federal subject. Krais are basically the same as oblasts, but are 
generally located at the frontier. The 21 republics have traditionally enjoyed a higher level of 
autonomy than the other regions. The okrugs are considered to be administrative divisions of 
other federal subjects, except for Chukotka Autonomous Okrug in the extreme northeast. 
Since the okrugs, except Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, are reported together with the 
subjects, who they are subordinated, this gives me 79 regional observations. 
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Figure 4.1: Russia’s regions: 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/37/Russian-regions.png 
 
4.2 Productivity 
In 1996, output per worker was 25 times higher in the most productive region (Tyumen incl. 
Khanty-Mansijsk & Yamalo-Nenets) compared to the region with the second lowest output 
per worker (Dagestan republic). Ingush republic was recorded as being by far the least 
productive, but the observations seem unreliable: both productivity level and growth vary 
extremely from year to year. I will therefore report summary statistics excluding that region.  
 
The highest level of labour productivity is to be found in the Urals and eastern Urals – which 
are substantially endowed with natural resources: oil, gas, metals and forests.5 This area is 
shaded dark shaded on the map in Fig. 4.2, which shows the geographical distribution of 
                                             
5
 Following Bradshaw (2006), I define resource production as production in the fuel, metal and timber, woodworking and 
pulp/paper industries. 
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productivity levels in 1996. The maps are divided into four equally large productivity 
intervals, with darker shading after productivity. The picture looks almost the same for 2004 
(Fig. 4.3).  
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Figure 4.2.  Labour productivity 1996.  
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Figure 4.3. Labour Productivity 2004. Source: Goskomstat, regional statistics. 
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When comparing the ranking of productivity rates in 1996 with 2004, I found that productivity 
rankings have remained quite stable. Spearman’s rho, which measures the ranking correlation, 
is 0.808. Scatter plot (Fig. 4.4) plot the productivity levels in 1996 against the productivity 
levels in 2004. From the scatter plot diagram (Fig. 4.4) we see that high productivity level in 
1996 is associated with a high productivity level in 2004. The plot show no clear signs of 
convergence. There are some vague signs on movements in the relative distribution of 
productivity rates among the initial middle to above middle productive regions, were some 
regions have managed to grow, while others have dropped in productivity. A group of initially 
least productive seems also to have lagged behind. Looking at the top five productive regions 
in 1996 compared to 2004, we see some movement in the ranking, but the two most 
productive – the resource-rich regions of Tyumen incl. Khanty-Mansijsk & Yamalo-Nenets 
and Sakha (Yakutia) republic – have retained their positions. The ranking of the bottom five 
remains the same in both years. (see  appendix A.4)  
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Figure 4. 4.  Labour productivity level in 1996 compared to 2004. Source: 
Goskomstat 
 
Regional output per worker has increased by almost 60 percentage points on average from 
1996 to 2004, but regional growth performance has differed substantially. While some regions 
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can note significant productivity growth over the whole period, others have experienced 
negative growth rates: in four regions, labour productivity fell during the period. Omsk oblast, 
one of the regions, was hard hit by the financial crash in 1998, and its manufacturing industry 
was almost halved.  
 
Figure 4.5) shows the regional distribution of average growth rates for the period 1996 to 
2004. While the map with productivity levels showed a clustering pattern in the resource belt, 
regions with the highest growth rates are scattered around the country. The resource-rich 
regions do not stand out here. Despite sharply rising oil prices from 1998, only some of the 
regions with substantial oil and gas production, like Sakhalin oblast and Arkhangelsk incl. 
Nenets, have had relatively high average growth.  Tyumen incl. Khanty-Mansijsk & Yamalo-
Nenets shows only moderate growth performance. The two main financial centres, St. 
Petersburg and Moscow, were among the regions with relatively high growth rates. 
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Figure 4.5: Average regional productivity growth 1997–2004. Source 
Goskomstat. 
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4.3 Regional distribution of resource intensive production 
Most of Russia’s resource rich regions are to be found in what is referred to as the Russian 
North (Blakkisrud 2006). Timber and cellulose production are largest in the north-west, 
Karelia republic and Arkhangelsk incl. Nenets.  Khanty-Mansijskn is the major oil-producing 
region, while most of Russia’s gas production takes place in Yamalo-Nenets, both included in 
Tyumen. Most metal production is located in the Far East and East Siberia, with Sakha 
(Yakutia) republic as the major metal producer. The maps in figures 4.6) to 4.9) show the 
regional distribution of the natural resource industries, fuel, metal and timber, woodworking, 
pulp and paper, in 1997. The resource maps are as the productivity maps divided into four 
equally large productivity intervals, with darker shading after productivity. Figure 4r to as the 
resource industry. From the four maps it is clear that natural resource industries as a share of 
regional industry production are largest in the more peripheral parts of Russia.  
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Figure 4.6: Regional share of fuel industry in production 
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Figure 4.7: Regional share of metal industry in production 
 
 
 
(75,100]
(50,75]
(25,50]
[0,25]
No data
Industrial structure 1997: Timber, woodworking, pulp and paper
 
Figure 4.8: Regional share of timber, woodworking, pulp and paper industry in 
production. 
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Figure 4.9: Regional share of natural-resource-intensive industries in 
production.  Source Goskomstat 
 
Russia is basically a resource-based economy, where the sectors stand for a large part of value 
added in Russia and almost all of the export revenues. The resource sector accounted for 
roughly 70 % of the growth in industrial production from 2001 to 2004, with the oil sector 
alone accounting for slightly less than 45 % (Ahrend 2006). The large resource endowments 
have given Russia high value-added production and created a sort of economic centre in the 
more or less peripheral areas of the country.   
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5. Empirical analysis 
In this chapter I investigate how relative productivity levels across the regions of Russia have 
developed during the period 1996–2004. Is there evidence of convergence or divergence in 
productivity levels? With productivity I have labour productivity in mind, defined as value-
added industrial production per employee. My focus will be on what has been traditionally 
regarded as Russian industry – oil and gas extraction, electricity production, mining and 
quarrying, and manufacturing. I will refer to these sectors simply as ‘industry’ or the industrial 
sector, in contrast to the service, transport or communication sector.  
 
The industry sector differs from other sectors in the Russian economy in its linkages to the 
Soviet past. By the end of the Soviet era, the Russian economy was already heavily 
industrialized, whereas the service and communication sector have largely developed during 
the transition. Assuming that history matters for further development, this makes this sector 
highly interesting when analysing the hypothesis of convergence in productivity. After years 
of central planning, productivity rates diverged greatly across as well as within sectors, and 
many regions had become highly specialized in one or two sectors.  
 
The year 1996 can be considered as the year when the economy started stabilizing under the 
new conditions. Since I am interested in how the distribution of productivity levels has 
developed in a market economy, this has been chosen as the first year of analysis. I focus on 
how the market forces have affected the distribution of productivity rates across Russian 
regions.  
 
Have investments and technology flowed into the least capital-intensive and less 
technologically advanced regions, such that the initially less-productive regions have caught 
up with the relatively more productive ones, – as predicted by the neoclassical and 
technology-gap models related to new growth theory? How important are regionally specific 
factors for this result? Is the initial industrial specialization of the Russian regions important 
for the outcome, or are factors – like a good business and investment climate, openness for 
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trade and good market access – more decisive? Will we find a tendency for agglomeration, as 
predicted by the Krugman (1991) model? What role do natural resources play in the Russian 
economy – are they a blessing or a curse for the regions highly dependent on them? To answer 
these questions I will do a convergence analysis, testing the impact of initial productivity on 
the average growth rate during the period. I will also control for the impact of certain regional 
specific factors, which can be highly relevant in determining regional convergence/divergence 
in Russia. To do this I will carry out a cross-regional analysis including a set of control 
variables. I will also perform a fixed-effect panel regression and compare the results. The first 
part of the chapter presents a discussion of methodology and choice of model and variables, 
while the results of the analyses are discussed in the last section. 
 
5.1 The concepts of convergence  
There are two main concepts of convergence: - and -convergence. If the initially less-
productive regions tend to grow faster than the more productive regions, given regional 
specific factors, we have -convergence. If we observe decreasing disparities in productivity 
levels over time, we have -convergence. It can be shown that -convergence is a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for -convergence6. 
 
Even though we get support for -convergence, in the sense that less productive regions tend 
to grow faster than the more productive ones, this does not necessarily reflect convergence as 
predicted by the Solow model or the technology-gap model of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997). 
It could be that less-productive regions grow faster, overtaking the productive leaders, such 
that over time large differences will remain, only with a shift in the leaders. This phenomenon, 
also known as ‘leapfrogging’, has been analysed by Brezis Krugman and Tsiddon (1993) 
among others. I will analyse -convergence to see whether the dispersion in the labour 
productivity levels is increasing or decreasing over time, but the main focus will be on -
                                             
6
 The equations for - and -convergence derived from the Solow model are presented in appendix 5.1, where I show more 
formally how the concepts are related. Interested readers are also advised to consult Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).  
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convergence. I will test for -convergence, in order to determine whether there is a tendency 
for less productive regions to catch up with initially more productive regions. 
  
5.2 The model 
The empirical literature on convergence analysis has tended to use cross regional data, 
whereas a panel-data approach has become more and more common with increased data 
availability, where Islam (1995) and Caselli et al. (1996) among others have contributed to the 
work. The cross-regional approach has been criticized for inconsistency due to omitted 
variable bias and that at least some of the explanatory variables are endogenous (Caselli et al. 
1996). Omitted variables could typically be inter-regional differences in technology, politics, 
culture and climate, which are not always observable. Since I have panel data it may be 
possible to remove the region-specific effects, including non-observable events, with model 
utilizing the variation over time as well as regions. The weakness is that the time intervals for 
which the growth rates are calculated over become shorter. This leads to estimates that are 
more sensitive for cycles around the trend. Only eight years are covered in my time series, 
which yields at most two four-year periods. As that the fluctuation has been substantial over 
the years in Russia, I will base my analysis on the cross-regional approach and use the results 
from the panel analysis as robustness check.  
 
Cross-regional regression  
To test for convergence I employ a linear model with average growth (agi) as a function of log 
initial productivity level (ln(cindi,1996)) and a set of explanatory variables, given by the matrix 
(Xj). Equation (5.1) defines the model to be used in the cross-regional analysis, while equation 
(5.2) describes how I have calculated the average growth rate. 
 
(5.1) ( ) ij ijjii Xcindbag ελα  +++= 1996,ln           
(5.2)  
=
=
2004
1997
,8
1
t
tii gag  
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b in eq. 5.1) is the convergence coefficient, α  is the intercept, assumed common to all 
regions, iε  is the regional-specific error term, and jλ  represents the coefficient on the  j 
control variables ( ijX ). A negative b implies that regions with relatively initial lower 
productivity level in general have higher average growth rates over the period analyzed, so a 
negative b supports the hypothesis of convergence.  
 
The Solow model and the technology-gap model of Barro and Sala-i-Martin predict a negative 
sign on b, while α  is assumed to be positive and to capture the common steady-state factors, 
including the long-term growth rate. Krugman’s core/periphery model predicts a positive sign 
on b and opens for the possibility that α  also can take negative values. According to the 
recourse curse argument we should expect to see a negative sign on resources, but the sign of b 
is not predicted, even though, since the initial most productive regions are the recourse rich 
regions, a negative sign on b could be reasonable to predict. 
 
The average growth rate (eq.5.1) is calculated from the yearly growth rates (gi,t) from 1997 to 
2004. This approach is somewhat different from that of the Barro and Sala-i-Martin regression 
(1991, 1992). Barro and Sala-i-Martin use the log of the end observations, the observations 
measured in the first and last years of the period analysed. This renders the average growth 
rate sensitive to possible cycles in these two years. To make the measure of the productivity 
growth trend more robust for cycles in the end observations, I take the average of the yearly 
regional growth rate. This is in general a more robust average. On the other hand, my measure 
is more sensitive to the large regional fluctuations in growth rates in the years after the 
financial crisis of 1998. So by comparing my result with the outcome, when using Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin’s method for calculating the growth rate, I can get an indicator of whether my 
results are sensitive to the fluctuations in the years after the financial crisis.  
 
Variables to include in the analysis 
There is no single answer to which control variables to include in the analysis. It all depends 
on the theory approach and characteristics of the area of interest, as well as data availability. 
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Based on the theory models presented in chapter 2 and what is deemed important for regional 
growth in Russia, I will include several state variables in the analysis. 
 
The classical factors derived from the Solow model are the rate of population growth and the 
share of production used in investments (investments), as well as investment in human capital 
(human capital). Investments in real and human capital are expected to have a positive impact 
on average growth in the regression, since higher values are assumed to determine higher 
steady states, while population growth is expected to have a negative impact. Capital 
investments have proven empirically important in explaining different steady-states.  
 
Variables related to endogenous growth theory are research and development (R&D), 
reflecting the regional rate of innovation, together with trade and foreign direct investments 
(FDI) as a share of the regional economy (FDI). The share of trade and FDI in the economy 
(trade and FDI) could reflect a region’s access to foreign technology. To capture possible 
national spillover effects I have included a regional ‘spillover’ variable (spillover). I also 
include a market potential variable (market potential), which describes another form for 
positive externalities, working through the size of the market. This variable is meant to 
capture the crucial mechanism in Krugman’s core/periphery model.  
 
Both settlement patterns and industrial location are influenced by the regional politics 
practised under the Soviet Union. The migration potential today may be considerable. In 
Russia, migration has followed two patterns: people move for job opportunities, and for a 
better climate. Migration is expected to have positive and negative effects in a growth 
regression, depending on the theory perspective. In the Solow model, the rate of migration is 
expected to accelerate the speed of convergence, while the flow of immigrants in the 
Krugman’s model increases the size of the market and thereby results in increased divergence. 
To capture both effects I will test for the effect of migration share (migration share) as well as 
total flow of net migrants (migration). 
 
Variables of regional industrial structure are commonly used as control variables in analysing 
convergence among regions within a country (see for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991 
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or Ahrend 2002 for the case of Russia). Major differences in industrial structure could be a 
barrier to technological catch-up. Since the regional differences in industrial structure in 
Russia are large, I will include structural variables in the analysis to test whether industrial 
composition is important for regional productivity growth and whether the different structure 
could be a barrier to convergence7.  
 
Given Russia’s economy and especially the dependence of some peripheral regions on natural 
resources in production, and the attention this has in economic literature, I will include the 
resource-variable (resources). This consists of the regional shares of fuel, timber, 
woodworking and the pulp- and paper and metal industry in production. Depending on the 
quality of the national and regional institution, the resource variable is expected to have 
positive or negative impact on growth. Thus this variable could also reflect institutional 
quality. Concerns have been voiced about the oil and gas sector, but I maintain that the 
“resource curse” argument applies to all sectors that are based on highly valuable natural 
resources with opportunities for easy gains. Even though the oil and gas industry is 
responsible for much of the revenues generated in the Russian economy, for some regions 
other sectors and resources, such as metals, diamonds and forest products, are a substantial 
source of revenue. The large fortunes from these commodities are a determining factor for a 
number of resource regions (Bradshaw 2006). 
 
Political and institutional differences, such as type of regime (often degree of democracy), rule 
of law and investment and business climate, are often assumed away when analysing 
convergence among national regions. It could be argued that regions within Russia are more 
equal than regions across different countries. On the other hand, regional policies during the 
1990s were fragmented and largely diversified in their reform performance, although in larger 
extent subordinated federal politics after Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000. What has 
been the successful political strategy during the transition has been hotly debated. Many 
authors have analysed the effect of reform-friendly policies, including the degree of price 
                                             
7
 The industry sector used in the analysis are described in the appendix (A.5.2)  
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liberalization and privatization, on economic performance, but the results are not clear.8 I will 
use the formation of small and medium-sized enterprises9 (SME) as an indicator of regional 
investment and business climate. SME formation can be considered as roughly equivalent to 
the number of new enterprises. The ‘openness’” indicators (trade and FDI) could also to some 
degree reflect market-friendly policies.  
 
A full list of the included variables and a description of how they are constructed are attached 
in appendix 4.2.  Some variables require extra attention as to their construction and quality as 
indicators. I will go through them in the following. Issues more directly related to the quality 
of the data will be discussed in a separate section (5.3). 
 
The variables under closer consideration 
The average educational level in Russia is high, so I will use the share of employees with a 
bachelor degree or higher (human capital) as an indicator of investment in human capital in 
Russian industry. A more common indicator has been, following Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992), the enrolment rate of secondary schooling, but this level of education could be too low 
to make any difference in the case of Russia. Given the good education system, most people in 
Russia can be assumed to have completed secondary schooling. 
 
The market potential for a firm is not restricted by the size of the economy of the region in 
question, but also the size of the markets in surrounding regions. A firm’s market potential is 
assumed to decline with distance, due to the presumed increase in trade costs. To measure 
region i’s market potential I take the sum of the gross regional product (GRP) of all the 
regions, including regions i’s GRP, and weight by the distance to region i. The distance 
between regions calculated by taking the great circle distances between the capitals.10 There is 
one important weakness with my calculations: foreign markets are not included. This probably 
                                             
8
 Berkowitz and DeJong 2001, Popov 2001 and Ahrend 2002 are just a few examples 
9
 SME is defined as an enterprise employing fewer than 250 people. 
10
 For a formal description of the mp variable see appendix (A.5.2). 
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gives the variable an eastward and inward (domestic) bias. The variable does not include the 
possible positive effects of being close to large foreign markets. The result is an 
underestimation of the effect of being located in central federal district or as well at the border 
to other Asian markets in the east. 
 
To capture the possible effect of inter-regional spillovers within Russia I have constructed an 
indicator (spillover) of technological transfer, similar to the market access variable, using the 
other regions’ productivity level instead of GRP. This indicator is based on the assumption of 
increased geographical proximity for the channels for technological spillovers in general, as 
trade and inter-regional investments. 
 
I have included the share of employees employed in R&D activities as an indicator of regional 
innovative capacity or innovative production in a region. Some uncertainties about how well 
this indicator reflects innovative capacity in the Russian regions may remain.  In Russia, 
despite relatively high inputs in R&D activity, output is generally disappointing, with little 
commercial potential. Most activities are run and financed by the state, while private-sector 
involvement in R&D is limited (Gianella and Tompson 2007). All the same, I have chosen to 
keep the innovation variable. At least I cannot rule out that hosting research institutions could 
generate some sort of positive externalities. Therefore I consider it better to include the 
variable, despite its flaws. 
 
My list of control variables is far from inclusive. Basically, I have selected those variables 
where reasonably good indicators are available. For many regional features it is difficult or 
even impossible to create reliable indicators. Especially political, cultural and institutional 
differences are hard to capture. In addition I have not been able to create a variable that 
captures the effect of being close to foreign markets. It could be argued that all these features 
change slowly over time, or at least the relative pattern between the regions remains 
approximately the same in time. Fixed-effect panel regression could therefore possibly control 
for these effects. I will therefore carry out a panel analysis to check the robustness of the 
convergence analysis.  
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Panel regression  
A fixed-effect panel regression is intended to control for all factors that vary across regions 
but remain fixed over time. By applying this method I test for a sort of conditional 
convergence. A negative sign on the convergence coefficient (b) implies convergence, 
conditional on all factors determining the different regional steady-states. 
 
 I will do a ‘before and after’ analysis, which is a type of fixed-effect regression with two time 
observations (Stock and Watson 2003). By dividing the dataset into two equal time periods 
(1996–2000 and 2000–2004), I get two equal equations for convergence (5.3), one for each 
sub-period τ  ( 2,1=τ ). Initial productivity for the first and second periods is measured in 
1996 and 2000 respectively, and the growth rates are the four-year average for each period.  
By subtracting the equation for period 1 from period 2, I get a difference equation (5.4) that 
expresses the change in average growth as a function of the change in productivity level. 
 
5.3. ( ) τττ ελα ,,, ln ij ijjii Xcindbag  +++=   2,1=τ  
5.4. ( ) ( )1,2,969912 lnln iicindcindbagag εε −+−=−  
 
By focusing on changes over time I have removed the factors that differ over regions, but are 
fixed over time. Theoretically this implies that I control for all regional characteristics 
determining steady-states, since these factors are assumed to remain fixed over time.  
 
What has been found important for regional economic performance? 
Several analysis of convergence in GRP per capita has been carried out, but as far as I know 
few have focused solely on the industrial sector. Industrial structure, resource endowment, 
human capital, market access and political and institutional factors have emerged as important 
for regional growth in GRP per capita, but the evidence differs. Maurseth (2005) and 
Östreich-Nielsen (2005) find evidence that being close to large national markets or having 
large resource endowment is favourable for regional growth. Ahrend (2002) finds that initial 
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industrial structure, endowment of natural resources and human capital had large impacts on 
economic growth performance during the 1990s. Also Dolinskaja (2002) derives a similar 
conclusion, with findings that confirm the importance of industrial structure and natural 
resources in explaining regional differences in growth rates. 
 
5.3 The Data 
The analysis is based on regional data from Goskomstat, which issues the official statistics in 
Russia, for the period 1996–2004. This gives me a balanced panel with 8 yearly and 79 
regional observations for growth and productivity level.  
 
Although technically correct, the Russian data suffer from reporting problems. Price statistics 
are often regarded as unsure, and views have differed as to whether it is preferable to use the 
official price statistics on deflation or not. It seems reasonable to believe that the statistics 
have improved since the consumer price index (CPI) was issued for the first time in 1992. 
Regional price statistics has only been issued recently. I have regional price statistics for the 
whole period reported in 2005 and 2006, which enables me to adjust for regional price 
differences over time. Despite their weaknesses, the regional price statistics for the industry 
are the best price indicator available and I will use them in deflation of the data. Assuming 
that the measurement error is equally distributed across regions, using a deflator based on 
these statistics will not cause any bias.  
 
Another potentially significant source of bias is the under-reporting of value added in the 
industry sector. Much of the value added generated in industry is reflected not in the accounts 
on the relevant industrial sector, but in the accounts of affiliated trading companies. Reduced 
tax is a strong motive, but there is to some extent a logical form of organization for products 
whose export and home market prices differ substantially (Ahrend 2004b). If the bias had 
been equally distributed across regions, it would not constitute any problem for the analysis. 
The problem is that this practice applies to certain sectors – natural resources in particular – 
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and when output is exported, which could have consequences for the observed regional 
distribution of productivity levels.  
 
According to World Bank estimates, value added from oil and gas production in GDP was 
under-represented by 11.4% in the official statistics in 2000 (World Bank 2004). This practice 
cannot be assumed to be constant over time, and the extent of this problem in 1996 can not 
easily be quantified. However, the risk that the reported value added in the large oil and gas 
producing regions is under-reported in 1996 is substantial. If the extent of under-reporting 
changes over time, that could also bias the observed regional distribution of growth rates.  
 
One way of circumventing this problem is to use production volume instead of value added. 
The measures are strongly correlated and in an analysis of productivity in several sectors of 
the Russian industry, Ahrend (2004) found that the results of using either measure were 
qualitatively similar. I will use value added in my analysis, since it is a more exact measure 
when analysing productivity.  
 
The problem of under-reporting value added in industry could cause some bias also in the 
trade data, since the problem especially concerns the resource industries and exporting sectors. 
If affiliated trade companies are located in other regions than the producers of the output, this 
will undermine the extent of trade in the producer regions. The importance of this potential 
bias is hard to estimate, but is probably less than the bias in value added. 
 
The observations on FDI are rather doubtful. A substantial part of the FDIs are actually 
Russian investments that have been on a ‘round trip’, and are not real foreign investments. 
The result is that the FDI variable also partly reflects Russian investments. 
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Despite the flaws in the trade and especially the FDI data, I consider the variables on share of 
trade and FDI in the economy as important for my analysis. The adoption of existing 
technology has proven to be a common form of innovative activity in Russian firms, while 
foreign competition provides incentives to innovate and invest in increased productivity 
among Russian firms (Kozlov and Yudaeva 2004). The ‘openness’ variables could therefore 
be important catching-up regional features connected to the technology-gap hypothesis. 
 
Missing values 
In general there are not many missing values, but some regions and variables stand out. For 
the regions Chechnya, Chukotka autonomous okrug and Ingush republic, some observations 
are missing. Several observations are missing for the industrial employment and structure 
variables. With Chechnya, observations are lacking on almost all variables, so I have chosen 
to remove Chechnya from the sample. Moreover, the region has been destabilized for a long 
time, and in that sense represents an outlier. For the other republics and variables I have 
enough information to extrapolate the missing observations. A description of which 
observations have been extrapolated and how is found in appendix (A.5.3). 
 
Data for Ingush republic seem afflicted by reporting bias in general. Observed values for 
several of the variables used in my analysis show large annual fluctuations for this region. 
Observed values on industrial structure, output per employee and investment fluctuate 
enormously from year to year. At the extreme, investment is reported as increasing by a factor 
well beyond 100. Such fluctuations can only to some extent be explained by the small size of 
the Ingush economy.   
 
5.4 Econometric issues  
For the regression and statistical calculations I have used the statistical programme package 
Stata/SE 10.0. I base my analysis on an ordinary least-square regression (OLS).  
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I will use observations from the first year of the period for the right-hand variables, to reduce 
the risk of problems connected to simultaneous causality. The variable for labour productivity 
was observed in 1996. Observations on my control variables were measured in 1996 (1997),11 
when possible. Only the variable for investment in human capital was observed in the middle 
of the period under study, whereas observations for investment in human capital are only 
available for 2000. 
 
Distribution of the data  
Figure 4.4.1. gives a picture of the distribution of average growth rates, conditional on initial 
productivity (1996). Most observations appear clustered around a slightly downward sloping 
line, but three observations stand out. The observation in the upper left corner represents the 
Ingush republic; the point furthest to the right is the oil- and gas-rich region of Tyumen incl. 
Khanty-Mansijsk & Yamalo-Nenets, while the observation second to the right is Sakha 
(Yakutia) republic, a region with considerable metal and mineral resources. Especially the 
Ingush republic can be regarded as a potential outlier – an assumption supported by the large 
annual fluctuation in the observations for that region. Tyumen incl. Khanty-Mansijsk & 
Yamalo-Nenets and Sakha (Yakutia) republic have by far the most resource-intensive 
production.  
 
                                             
11For some of the variables I use 1997 observations, in the absence of 1996 observations. In the variable table in appendix 
(A.5.2) I have noted the year observed. 
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Figure 5.4. 2: Average growth 1997–2004 versus productivity level in 1996 
 
Since the OLS estimators are sensitive to outliers I will control for the three outlier regions in 
the analysis. I will in the absolute convergence analysis run a regression with regional 
dummies, but also one when the Ingush republic is omitted from the sample. In the multiple 
regression analysis, testing for conditional convergence, I will drop the observation on the 
Ingush republic and assume that the resource variable accounts for much of the effect from 
Tyumen incl. Khanty-Mansijsk & Yamalo-Nenets and Sakha (Yakutia) republic.  
 
The dummy for the Ingush republic (d_Ingush) is highly correlated with the share of trade in 
the regional economy. The correlation coefficient is 0.945, which might mean problems with 
multicollinearity. In general, correlation between the variables is not a problem for the 
analysis and the OLS estimators are still valid under imperfect multicollinearity. When the 
correlation between two explanatory variables is high it results in less precise estimates and 
the test statistics become less reliable. Only a few variables in addition to d-Ingush have 
substantially high correlations. The variable for the share of people employed in R&D is 
highly correlated with the variable for market potential, education and especially total 
migration. Market potential is also substantial (corr	2/3) correlated with spillover and 
migration. Not surprisingly, the resource variable is highly correlated with initial 
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productivity.12 The correlation matrix below shows the correlation between selected samples 
of variables; the full correlation table is presented in appendix 4.4.   
   
The financial crisis  
The financial crisis of 1998 could be important for the analysis, for two reasons. First it has 
been argued that the years following the crisis, including the regime shift in 2000, represent a 
potential shift in the Russian economy, possible changing the importance of the underlying 
forces in the economy (see for example Maurseth 2005, Nielsen 2005). Second the financial 
crisis was an economic shock, so the growth rates in the years immediately before and after 
may not reflect real economic change. 
 
As mentioned, comparison with the regressions based on the Barro and Sala-i-Martin  growth 
rates will give an indication  of the robustness of my results for the fluctuating growth rates 
after the financial crisis, since their estimate do not include the growth rates from those years 
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991, 1992). 
 
The cutback in the large federal subsidies to the industry, made necessary by the massive 
governmental deficit, and the fiscal reform from 2000 aimed at making federal transfers more 
coherent, can be argued to remove some of the barriers to convergence. On the other hand, the 
simultaneous oil price increase could work the other way around, reinforcing the already 
sizable difference between the ‘resource regions’ and the other regions. Maurseth (2005) and 
Östreich Nielsen (2005) found that fuel and energy became more important in explaining 
differences in growth rates after 1998. Because of the short time period, and the large 
fluctuation in the growth rates also in the years after the financial crisis, I will not put any 
focus on dividing my regression into several periods.  
 
                                             
12
 A correlation table for all the variable in the analysis, except the variables for the different industry sectors is attached in 
the appendix. No of the sector variables are however highly correlated with any of the other variables.  
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5.5 Empirical results 
From my descriptive analysis I found that the largest resource-rich regions were by no means 
the most productive, whether in 1996 or in 2004. I also found that the productivity ranking 
was quite stable, especially at the bottom. The five least productive regions in 1996 were the 
same in 2004. Even though the ranking has remained quite stable, the productivity differences 
between regions could have decreased. Whether the regional productivity rates have 
converged or diverged from 1996 to 2004, and dependent on which factors, is what I will try 
to answer next.  
 
Absolute convergence  
The test for absolute convergence supports neither convergence nor divergence among 
Russian regions. The convergence coefficient, b, has in general a slightly negative sign, but is 
definitely insignificant. When controlling for potential outliers, the effects of initial 
productivity on growth disappear.  
 
The results are presented in Tab.5.5.1. The first row shows the basic regression, R1, on a full 
sample without any regional dummies. In regression 2, R2, I have included a dummy for the 
Ingush republic (d_Ingush), potential outliers. I have also tested the effect of including 
dummies for additional two potential outliers, the resource regions Tyumen incl. Khanty-
Mansijsk & Yamalo-Nenets (d_Tyumen) and Sakha (Yakutia) republic (d_Sakha), in the 
regression. These results are found in appendix (A.5.5). In regression 3, R3, I have removed 
the Ingush republic from the sample. In the final regression (R4) I have tested the hypothesis 
of convergence on the 2/3 initially richest regions. 
 
The convergence coefficient is slightly negative, but not significant in either of the 
regressions. Controlling for potential outliers further reduces the significance of b. Only the 
dummy for the Ingush republic (d_Ingush) is significant, while the two other regional 
dummies do not show any significant effects on the result. Including a dummy for Ingush 
republic (d_Ingush) increases the explanatory power considerable. This large increase, 
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because of controlling for one observation, is disturbing, and provides a strong argument for 
removing Ingush republic from the sample. When the observations for Ingush republic are 
removed from the sample, R-square drops. 
 
  Absolute convergence 
  R1 R2 R3 R4 
Obs 79 79 78 78 
R-squared 0.1087 0.6433 0.0014 0.0013 
  Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| 
lncind –0.0467 0.2300 –0.0034 0.6860 –0.0034 0.684 –0.0043 0.7040 
constant 0.2340 0.0800 0.0853 0.0020 0.0853 0.002 0.0883 0.0320 
d_Ingush     0.5670 0.0000      
Table 5.5: Testing for absolute convergence 
 
Regression (regr4) shows results of testing the hypothesis on convergence on the 2/3 initially 
richest regions. The rationale for this is that the least productive regions could stand out when 
it comes to convergence. In the Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) technology-gap model there 
could exist a threshold for where the gap between the least productive regions and the 
technology developed and advanced regions is too large. A possible outcome is then that the 
laggard regions are simply left behind.  I have found that the productivity ranking is quite 
stable for the initially least productive regions, when comparing their productivity rank in 
1996 against their rank in 2004. Regression 4 does not support the hypothesis of higher 
convergence among regions that were more similar in terms of initial productivity. I have also 
looked if there is any sign of convergence among the 1/3 least productive. The convergence 
coefficient is significantly negative, but the sign of convergence disappears totally when the 
Ingush republic is controlled for. Results from this regression are presented in appendix A.5.5.  
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There are in general no signs of either absolute convergence or divergence in my data.13 The 
OLS estimator appears quite sensitive to the observation for the Ingush republic and the 
explanatory power increases disturbingly when a dummy for Ingush republic is included. I 
will continue to test for conditional convergence, as argued, without the Ingush republic in the 
sample.  
 
Conditional convergence 
My findings support in general the hypothesis of conditional convergence, although there is 
not sign of any strong convergence. There is no single factor alone which, when controlled 
for, leads to convergence in the results. When I include investments, including FDI, 
population growth or migration, in combination with resources and/or trade, the convergence 
result become significant. (See Table 5.5.2 and Table 5.5.3.)  
 
Only the regressions most important for explaining the fit of the theory and/or the pattern in 
data are included. Some other regressions are presented in appendix A.5.5. I have divided the 
regressions into two categories, according to which theory they are basically explaining. In 
Table 5.5.2 I have reported the regressions including the factors important in neoclassical 
convergence, while Table 5.5.2 includes variables important for the technological catch-up 
argument. Both tables include a variable controlling for regional resource production.  
 
When only the classical factors from Solow model and investment in human capital are 
included, the sign on b is negative, but insignificant. Investments prove to be an important 
determinant for productivity growth. This is an expected result, especially since the Russian 
economy had been stagnating for many years prior to 1996 and, even though the economy was 
capital-intensive, the capital equipment used by the firms was not necessarily the most 
                                             
13
 I have also tested for absolute convergence for the sub-periods, 1996 –1998 and 1999–2004, but the results were not 
significantly different when the Ingush republic was removed from the sample. The results are attached in appendix (A.5.5). 
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productive. It is reasonable to expect great potential in Russian firms for productivity growth 
through investments and adoption of already existing technology. 
 
Human capital seems not to explain the regional differences in productivity. This might be 
because the model tested is biased from omitting variables, such as migration share, that are 
expected to be positively correlated with human capital but have negative impact on 
productivity growth in the Solow model. Including potential omitted variables does not 
increase the significance on human capital.  
 
Population growth and the migration share have a negative coefficient as predicted by the 
Solow model. Although the variables have high coefficients, the effects of the variables are 
uncertain, and their significance depend on that both variables are included. Since population 
growth includes number of migrants to a region, the variables are highly correlated 
(
=0.9297). When both are included in the analysis, the effect from migration is estimated 
positive, while population growth is strongly negative. This supports the hypothesis that 
people migrate for job opportunities and/or that migrants tend to be relatively more 
resourceful than the average population.  
 
The variable on the share of foreign direct investments in the economy (FDI) is included in 
the ‘Solow-model’ table, because it constitutes a part of the total investment share in industry. 
The variable proves to be significant in most of the specifications. Since the spillover effect 
from FDI could be rather ambiguous, the positive sign could be applied to the direct 
investment effect from FDI. On the other hand, FDI differs from investments, in that the FDI 
variable is correlated with other ‘catch-up’ variables, such as share of employment in R&D, 
SME, trade and market potential.  
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Neoclassical model 
 
R5 R6 
Obs 78 78 
R-squared 0.1184 0.2251 
R-squared adj 0.0701 0.1713 
 
  
 Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| 
lncind -0.0064 0.4920 -0.0265 0.0210 
constant 0.0265 0.5840 0.0827 0.0160 
control variables     
Investments (sinv)  0.1109 0.0170 0.0601 0.1430 
Population growth (n) -0.9423 0.2250 -0.3957 0.4540 
Human capital (prof) 0.0019 0.3020   
FDI/GRP (sfdi)   0.0021 0.0020 
Resources (res)   0.0007 0.0450 
Table 5.5. 4. The Neoclassical Model 
 
When the FDI-variable is included together with resources, the convergence coefficient 
becomes significant at the 5% significance level, supporting convergence. Also when we 
include the combination FDI and ‘openness for trade’ (trade), the convergence result becomes 
significant.  
 
Comparing regression R6 (Tab. 4.5.2) and regression R7 (Tab. 5.5.3) we see that including the 
trade-variable in the regression greatly increases the explanatory power of the model. Together 
with the regional investments, trade is the most robust variable, explaining a significant share 
of the variation in regional growth rates. No other factor stands out alone as so important for 
explaining the variation in the data.  
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In regression R8 I have included a set of variables, which could be important for catching-up 
through technological transfer. Trade and FDI are still significant. Migration is the only of the 
new variables with significant effect, but the coefficient is quite low. Neither spillover, the 
share employed in R&D (R&D) nor SME has significant effect. R&D is highly correlated 
with migration, but removing migration does not increase the significance of the R&D 
variable. The variable intended to capture inter-regional technological spillovers is not 
significant. When we replace spillover with the variable on market potential in the regression, 
SME becomes significant (R9), but the coefficient on SME is also quite low. Neither SME 
nor migration can be considered as very robust, since their significance is sensitive for the 
combination of variables included in the regression.  
 
The low significance of the R&D variable is not surprising, given that the Russian R&D 
sector is considered to be highly unproductive and that few innovations have commercial 
potential (Gianella and Tompson 2007).The low effect of the spillover variable is also not 
surprising, in view of the scattered production structure in Russia.  
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The technology gap model 
  
R7 R8 R9 
Obs 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.3335 0.4231 0.3345 
R-squared adj 0.2772 0.3467 0.2680 
          
    
  
Coefficien
t P>|t| 
Coefficien
t P>|t| 
Coefficien
t P>|t| 
lncind -0.0298 0.015 -0.0249 0.049 -0.0249 0.0660 
constant 0.0829 0.0000 0.091 0.013 0.1090 0.0030 
control variables             
investment  0.0776 0.039 0.0868 0.0030 0.0822 0.0530 
population growth -0.9031 0.1370         
FDI 0.0015 0.0180 0.0016 0.0210 0.0017 0.0060 
trade 0.0829 0.0000 0.0729 0.0000 0.0858 0.0000 
Net migration     -0.0009 0.0010 -0.0007 0.0000 
SME     0.0002 0.1640 0.0004 0.0000 
R&D     0.2990 0.1220   
spillover     0.0010 0.1340     
market potential         0.0000 0.0380 
resourses 0.0015 0.018 0.0004 0.2800 0.0002 0.5950 
Table 5.5. 5. The technology gap model.  
 
The analysis does not support Krugman’s hypothesis of divergence and economic 
agglomeration. The convergence coefficient has in general a negative sign, although it is not 
significant in all regressions. The variable reflecting market potential proves to be significant 
in some occasions, but is not robust. Migration, which should in the presence of economies of 
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scale have a positive impact on growth rates, generally has a negative sign in the results. 
However, there are, as mentioned, two different underlying motives for migration: climate and 
better economic opportunities. There is a possibility that migration flows could act differently, 
according to whether the migrants seek economic opportunities or better climate conditions. 
Migration to the economic centre with job opportunities could have a positive impact, but is 
counteracted by the negative impact from ‘better climate’ migrants. Either way, the hypothesis 
of higher growth in regions with large market potential has not been supported. 
 
I also tested whether industrial structure could explain some of the differences in growth rates 
over the period, but no single sector had any explanatory power, and the coefficient were all 
insignificant. The results from this regression are found in Appendix A.5.5. My findings 
contrast with Ahrend’s results from analysing the importance of industrial structure on 
regional growth in GRP. Using the almost the same sectoral division as I do,14 reported by 
Goskomstat, he found initial industrial structure to be important for economic growth (Ahrend 
2002).  The reason could be that his analysis concerns a somewhat earlier period, 1990 to 
1998, while I am analysing a somewhat later period, where part of the industrial restructuring 
from the transition had already been accomplished.  
 
The only structural variable that appears to have some explanatory power is the variable 
reflecting the regional share of resource industry in production. Each of the defined resource 
sectors (fuel, metals and timber, woodworking and pulp-and-paper industry) shows no 
significant effect on average growth separately. This indicates that they have some common 
characteristics important for explaining regional growth performance. All three sectors are 
important generating large gains for the regions endowed with the resources. The results do 
not support the ‘resource curse’ argument, but the hypothesis can neither be rejected The 
resource variable has a positive coefficient, but is not robust and depend on the variables 
included in the analysis.   
                                             
14We both use the sector divisions supplied by Goskomstat; the only difference is that I have merged a few of the sectors, but 
this should not have any decisive effect. 
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The result do not change substantially, when calculating the average growth rate following 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991,1992). My conclusions remain. This implies that the main 
conclusions of the analysis are not very sensitive for how the average growth rates are 
calculated.  
 
My results seem to support the hypothesis of conditional convergence predicted by the Solow-
model and technology-gap model by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997). In addition to initial 
productivity, of the control variables, investment and trade seem to be most important in 
explaining the observed differences in regional productivity growth rates. I will in the next run 
a fixed effect panel regression and compare with my former results.  
 
Comparing the cross-regional analysis with the panel regression 
The panel regression supports the result of conditional convergence. Castelli et al. among 
others have showed that using a panel analysis instead of a cross-regional increases the 
estimate of the convergence coefficient. An omitted variable bias tends to underestimate the 
estimate on the convergence coefficient, but the fact that the analysis are more sensitive to 
business cycles could also cause an upward bias on the estimates. Since the time period is 
short, I will not focus on the magnitude of the coefficient, but rather use this regression as a 
check. The results from the panel regression support my general findings in the conditional 
convergence analysis. The result from the panel regression is shown in table 5.5.4. 
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Panel regression 
Regions Year 
Obs 
78 8 
R-squared 0.8173 
 
  
  
Coeffici
ent P>|t| 
lncind96 -0.3697 0.0000 
constant 0.0593 0.0000 
  Table 5.5. 4. Panel Regression 
 
5.6 Testing for -convergence 
To know I have focused on what is referred to as -convergence, or convergence towards 
mean. In general there is evidence that initially less productive regions have experienced 
greater growth from 1996 to 2004, conditional on factors like share of investments in 
production (national and foreign), openness for trade and large resource industry. At the same 
time, some regions have fallen behind, while other regions have had substantial growth. Even 
though there is some evidence to indicate that the “laggards” are catching up, it may be that 
the dispersion in productivity is increasing over time.  
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Table 5.5 5: Sigma-convergence  Source: Goskomstat 
 
From the graph we see that the dispersion in labour productivity is largely varying over time. 
The variance on log (labour productivity) does a large jump around 1997, possibly related to 
financial crisis. The large differences remain in the years after, until dropping around 2001.  
One explanation could be that the industry in the years after the financial crisis was 
characterized by restructuring. There could be, especially for the years around 1998 that some 
regions owing industries, which managed to utilize the opportunities after the finical crises, 
experienced large improvement in labour productivity and thereby improved their relative 
ranking in productivity. I can not rule out the risk that the conditional convergence pattern is 
influenced by a shift in relative productivity ranking. At the other hand will I contend that my 
conclusions from analysing -convergence remain. 
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6. Conclusion  
I have analysed the regional development of labour productivity levels in the Russian industry, 
defined as oil and gas extraction, electricity production, mining and quarrying, and 
manufacturing, in the years when the economy can be considered stabilized under the new 
market conditions.  
 
My results do not support the hypothesis of absolute convergence, but the conditional 
convergence predicted by both the Solow-model and the technology-gap model by Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) get supported. Investment and trade, but also to large extent FDI stand 
out as the most important control variables explaining differences in productivity growth. 
Assuming that trade and FDI are important channels for international technological spillovers, 
these findings could be explained, among others, by the technology-gap model. 
 
I do not find any tendency for agglomeration among the Russian regions, or any spatial 
association regarding productivity levels. The regions proving highest productivity growth 
during the period seem to be scattered around the country. 
 
Differentiated industrial structure across regions has been emphasized as important when 
analysing regional convergence and is described as a potential barrier for technological 
transfer. In contrast to Ahrend (2002), who analyse the effect of the industrial structure over a 
some what earlier period, industrial structure does not explain the observed regional 
differences in productivity growth rates in my analysis. By the financial crisis most of the 
inter-sectoral restructuring was accomplished, but there has proven to be substantial intra-
sectoral restructuring in the years after.  
 
Only the variable indicating the share of resource industry in the total industrial production 
prove to have some explanatory power. Although, owing large resource endowment seems not 
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to be neither boosting nor hampering growth in the Russian regions. The middle range results 
for resource rich regions regarding average productivity growth could have been influenced by 
the substantial underreporting in that sector. 
 
By analysing for -convergence I find that the dispersion in productivity level increased 
sharply right before the financial crisis in 1998 and remained high in the years after until 
dropping around 2001. Even though my results seem not to be sensitive for including these 
years in my average growth estimates, I can not rule out that there has been a shift in the 
underlying forces working in the economy. For further research should look into these issues 
in a longer time perspective, especially comparing the period before and after the 1998 
financial crisis and the subsequent economic instability.  
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A.4 
Labour productivity: Top5 
Regions 
Productivity 
1996 Regions 
Productivity 
2004 
Tyumen  216.080 Tyumen 337.339 
Sakha (Yakutia) republic 125.463 Sakha (Yakutia) republic 153.299 
Chukotka auton. okrug (10) 70.029 Komi republic (13) 113.205 
Krasnoyarsk  60.391 Lipetsk oblast (14) 112.04 
Vologda oblast (12) 55.122 Krasnoyarsk 111.536 
Table A 4.1. Labour productivity: Top5 
 
Labour productivity: Bottom 5 
Regions Productivity 1996 Regions Productivity 2004 
Ingush republic 3.838 North Ossetia - Alania 11.417 
Dagestan republic 8.639 Altai republic 12.626 
North Ossetia - 
Alania 
9.770 Ingush republic 14.917 
Adygeya republic 11.386 Dagestan republic 15.364 
Altai republic 11.910 Adygeya republic 17.758 
Table A 4.2 Labour productivity: Bottom 5 
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Variable Mean Std. Dev.  
mean 
adjusted 
Std. Dev.15  Min Max Difference Median 
Lower 
quartile 
Upper 
quartile 
cind1996 31.838 26.758 34,419 8.639 216.080 207.441 19.249 25.601 38.143 
cind1997 33.568 27.067 33,022 9.749 225.544 215.795 19.241 28.094 40.962 
cind1998 33.255 30.995 38,170 9.219 258.688 249.469 18.609 25.959 38.393 
cind1999 35.189 33.459 38,940 7.015 274.901 267.886 20.098 28.747 40.983 
cind2000 44.940 43.658 39,785 7.759 354.716 346.957 24.092 36.506 49.855 
cind2001 46.652 38.145 33,486 11.039 284.316 273.277 25.063 39.231 53.706 
cind2002 44.540 34.814 32,011 11.323 275.350 264.027 24.257 39.052 51.270 
cind2003 47.792 42.727 36,613 11.668 361.165 349.496 25.043 41.035 54.081 
cind2004 50.807 43.115 34,753 11.417 337.339 325.922 26.006 40.503 56.960 
Table A 4.3.  Annual average labour productivity 
                                             
15
 Weighted by productivity average over the period as a fraction of the annual average. 
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Regional average 
productivity growth Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Differanse Median  
Lower 
quartile 
Upper 
quartile 
Average 1996-2004 0.0747 0.05  -0.028 0.231 0.259 0.065 0.044 0.105 
 ag_ing16 0.083 0.091 -0.028 0.752 0.78 0.065   0.044  0.106  
g1997 0.068 0.171 -0.577 0.482 1.059 0.048 -0.019 0.168 
g1998 0.017 0.377 -0.561 2.819 3.380 -0.060 -0.124 0.076 
g1999 0.059 0.225 -0.601 0.841 1.442 0.047 -0.082 0.170 
g2000 0.288 0.305 -0.094 2.015 2.109 0.224 0.093 0.369 
g2001 0.097 0.205 -0.344 1.089 1.433 0.084 -0.032 0.208 
g2002 -0.028 0.174 -0.580 0.494 1.074 -0.036 -0.099 0.086 
g2003 0.089 0.252 -0.173 2.009 2.181 0.055 -0.022 0.139 
g2004 0.062 0.170 -0.365 0.536 0.901 0.031 -0.058 0.175 
Table A. 4.4.  Annual average growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             
16
 ag_ing is the estimate on average productivity including Ingush republic. 
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Top10 Bottom10 
Region Avg. growth Region Avg. growth 
Ingush republic   0.1508 Omsk oblast   -0.0891 
Sakhalin oblast   0.1288 Evrei autonomous oblast   -0.0357 
Arkhangelsk incl. Nenets   0.1223 Ulyanovsk oblast   -0.0153 
Astrakhan oblast   0.1210 Orenburg oblast   -0.0082 
Saint-Petersburg   0.1166 Kamchatka incl. Koryak    0.0017 
Moscow oblast   0.1130 Volgograd oblast    0.0048 
Lipetsk oblast    0.1115 Altai republic   0.0065 
Komi republic    0.1108 Bashkortostan republic   0.0100 
Magadan oblast    0.1060 Altai krai   0.0105 
Kursk oblast    0.0797 Tuva republic   0.0109 
Table A. 4.5. Top and Bottom 10 
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A.5: 
6.1 The concepts of convergence  
 
Driving expressions for  -convergence from the Solow-model  
In chapter 3 I showed that the growth rate in the Solow model could be expressed 
approximately as a function of the distance to steady-state (eq. 3.7). By solving this dynamic 
equation, eq. 3.7, we get an expression for the growth in output per unit of effective labour 
( ( )( )




0ˆ
ˆln
ty
ty ) as a function of initial output per effective unit of labour ( ( )0ˆ ty ), eq. A.5.1. 0t  is 
defined as the initial starting point.  Dividing the growth in output per unit of effective labour 
into the rate of technological growth (x) and growth in output per capita ( ( )( )




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tyln ), we get 
eq. A.5.2. Let the length of the time interval ( 0t ,t)  be T and 0t = 0. By dividing (eq. A.5.2.) 
through with T we get (eq.A.5.3), an expression of average growth rate over a period of T 
years as a function of the regional steady-state and initial income. 
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Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) use a discrete version similar to A.4.3 as a starting point 
for their convergence analyses, were the average growth rates (ag) are calculated according to 
equation A.5 .4. 
A .5.4   





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0
ln1
y
y
T
ag T  
 
 
Driving expressions for  –convergence 
By taking a discrete version of A.5.3) and include a random disturbance term ( tiu ,  ), an 
expression for the variance in productivity can be derived. Assuming that the ( tiu , ) is 
independently distributed, has a zero mean and constant variance, 2uσ , then the variance of 
( )tyln , 2tσ  , can be expressed by the following dynamics, (eq. A.5.5): 
 
A.5.5) 22 122 utt e σσσ β += −−  
 
From this expression we see that -convergence is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for 
-convergence. 
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6.2 Cross-regional analysis 
Table of control variables 
Code Variable name Description Comment Year 
ag Average growth 
=
=
2004
1997
,8
1
t
tii gag  
gi,t is the 
regional 
yearly growth 
rates 
1997-
2004 
lncind Labour productivity Log (value added/employees)  1996 
sinv Investments  investment/value added   1996 
n Population growth 
 
 1997 
prof Human capital Bachelor or higher  2000 
sfdi FDI  sfdii=fdii/GRPi US$ 1996 
strade Trade  stradei=(importi+exporti)i/GRPi US$ 1997 
totmig Migration net number of migrants  1000  
smig Migration share    
wsme 
 SME i
i
i smey
y
wsme ⋅=

 
y : regional 
average GRP  
1996 
mp 
Market potential 
≠
+=
ij
i
j
j
i GRPd
GRP
mp
,1996
,1996
,1996
,1996
17
 
 1996 
res 
Resources resources=fuel + metals
 18
 + timber, 
woodworking and pulp-and-paper industry 
% share of 
value added  1997 
srd R&D 
number employed in R&D/total number of 
employees  1996 
spillover 
Spillover 
≠
=
ij j
j
i d
cind
spillover
,1996
,1996
,1996  
cindj is 
productivity 
in region j 
1996 
Table A.5.1: Variables used in the analysis.  Source: Goskomstat 
 
                                             
17
 For a closer description see below. 
18
 Metals incl. ferrous and non-ferrous metal production. 
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Industry sectors 
I use the classification given by Goskomstat. The sectors marked with *are merged from the 
original classification. The variables are measures as share of value added in the industry 
sector in total. 
Code Industry sectors year 
el Electricity production 1997 
fuel Fuel industry 1997 
metal Metal extraction and production:  ferrous + non-ferrous metals* 1997 
petchem Chemical and petrochemical industry 1997 
machmet Machine-building and metal cutting industry 1997 
timbcell Timber, woodworking and pulp-and-paper industry 1997 
light Light industry 1997 
constcer Constructions materials + ceramic and porcelain production* 1997 
foodgrain Food processing + grain and animal food industry* 1997 
Table A.5.2: Industry sectors used in the analysis.  Source: Goskomstat 
 
Market potential 
I will use a weighted sum of all Russian regions  `GRP, including region i s` GRP, as an 
indicator on region i s` “market potential” (mp). The weight are based on the other regions 
distance to region i, such that GRP in regions far away will have little influence. The formula 
for mpi  can be expressed as follows: 
 
A.5.6. 
≠
+=
ij
i
j
j
i GRPd
GRP
mp
,1996
,1996
,1996
,1996  i∀  
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The distance is calculated utilizing the regions latitude and longitude degrees (latd and latm) 
and minutes (latm and lonm). These can be converted into decimal degrees (lat and lon) by the 
following formulas: 
 
60
60
lonmlondlon
latmlatdlat
+=
+=
 
 
“lat” and “lon” are further converted into radians: 
( )
180
180
90
pi
pi
×=
×−=
lonY
latX
i
i
   i∀  
The variables Xi and Yi  are used as inputs in an arc distance computation, which generates 
the distance between the regional centres:  
 
{ }jijiji XXXXYYdist coscossinsincosarccos0.3959 ×+××−×=   ji ≠  
 
6.3 Missing values 
The price index for Chukotka 
The 1997 observation on the industrial price index for Chukotka autonomous okrug 
(Pind,chukotka)  is missing.. Since I will keep Chukotka autonomous okrug in my sample I will 
extrapolate a value for PInd,chukotka in 1997 (PInd,chukotka,1997). There are several ways to do this. 
Because of the large fluctuations in prices over time, observations on price indexes for later 
years do not necessarily reflect the price level in 1997. The industrial price index for 
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Chukotka seem to follow the consume price index for Chucokta (CPIchukotka). By regression I 
found that the first lag of CPIchukotka best explains the variation in Pind,chukotka over the period 
1998-2004. Based on the coefficient from this regression (tab. A.5.3.) and the observations on 
CPIchucotka in 1996 I can calculate PInd,chukotka,1997 .   
1.lag Consum Price Chukotka 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 67,0101416 17,09074599 3,920844 0,011173 
123,6 0,40066902 0,12984738 3,085692 0,027293 
 
Table A.5.3.: Estimates PInd,chukotka,1997,. source: Goskomstat 
 
Using the numbers from the regression in tab.A.4.3.1 the calculation of PInd,chukotka,1997  can be 
expressed by equation A.5.7.: 
A.5.7.   1997chukotkaind,P  = 67,01 + 0,401* 1996chukotkacons,P  
 
Employment data 
Total employment in the industrial sector is calculated from the reported share of employment 
in the industry (oil and gas extraction, electricity production, mining and quarrying, and 
manufacturing industry) times the total regional employment. Observations for the industrial 
employment share are missing for 1996. They are not included in the statistics I have become 
from Goskomstat. The time series includes the years 1995 to 2004 except 1996. To construct a 
measure of industrial productivity I need a full time series of the employment in the industry.  
Since I have observations on the employment share in 1995 and 1997 I can replace the 
missing observation on 1996 by the average of 1995 and 1997 employment share. For 
Chukotka is also the observation on total employment in 1996 missing. I replace the missing 
1996 observation with data on total employment in Chukotka in 1997, adjusted for the 
regional average fall in employment from 1996 to 199719.  
                                             
19
 The average regional employment is approximately 20% higher in 1996 than in 1997. 
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Data on industrial structure  
Several observations are missing on the share of different industry sectors in.  How many 
observations, which are missing varies from sector to sector. The electric power industry, 
machine-building and metal cutting industry, timber, woodworking and the pulp-and-paper 
industry, building materials industry, the light industry and the food industry have none or 
almost non missing values, while the ceramic and porcelain industry has almost half of its 
values missing.  
  
The main reason that observations are missing for a sector is either that the sector do not exist 
in that region or that the sector only constitute a marginal share of the region’s industrial 
production. The ceramic and porcelain sector are very small in Russia and of insignificant size 
on national basis. Also the resource sectors, especially the fuel and metallurgy industry, have 
some missing values. This is not surprising since production in these sectors is mainly 
concentrated in a few regions with large natural resource endowments. Since I am interested 
in the effect of regional specialization, missing values for sectors, which in general only 
constitute a small share of the total regional production, are not critical, even though the 
amount of missing values is significant for certain sectors. For example the resource curse 
argument is concerned about regions having large resource endowments. Observations for all 
these regions are present. To control for initial industrial structure I use observations for 1997 
when analysing growth in the second period. Since the industrial structure does not change 
significantly from 1997 to 1998 I have replaced the missing values for 1997 observations from 
1998, when they exist and zero for the rest. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4  Correlation table 
  ag lncind sinv n 
educatio
n smig 
migratio
n sfdi strade wsme mp spillover srd res 
                 
ag 1               
lncind -0.0371 1              
sinv 0.2604 0.006 1             
n -0.0861 -0.2559 0.2496 1            
prof 0.1269 -0.1936 0.1742 0.3816 1           
smig -0.0706 -0.3311 0.0312 0.9296 0.3081 1          
totmig -0.1001 -0.0133 0.0308 0.4544 0.5568 0.4414 1         
sfdi 0.3367 0.0732 0.1417 -0.1095 0.2274 -0.1384 0.2697 1        
strade 0.3663 0.2457 0.0845 0.1868 0.2837 0.1305 0.275 0.1907 1       
wsme 0.2417 -0.1184 -0.0617 0.0782 0.5092 0.1072 0.1243 0.0828 0.1604 1      
mp 0.066 0.3058 0.0453 0.3023 0.402 0.2779 0.7202 0.4093 0.3032 0.1296 1     
spillover 0.2081 -0.077 -0.1099 0.1984 0.4266 0.2652 0.5119 0.4461 0.2313 0.386 0.7665 1    
srd 0.0346 0.0774 -0.1417 0.2881 0.6546 0.2921 0.8197 0.3232 0.3001 0.3865 0.6754 0.5447 1   
res 0.1618 0.6535 0.2594 -0.2072 -0.3072 -0.3121 -0.2208 -0.0534 0.2811 -0.1957 0.0713 -0.169 -0.2403 1 
A.5.4.: Correlation table. Source Goskomstat.  
 
6.5 Empirical results 
Testing for absolute convergence 
 
Including dummies for outliers 
Absolute convergence 
Obs 79 
R-squared 0.6433 
 Coefficient P>|t| 
lncind 0.0000 1.0000 
constant 0.0747 0.0560 
d_Ingush 0.5731 0.0000 
d_Sakha -0.0410 0.0710 
d_Tyumen -0.0048 0.8680 
Table 5.5. Absolute Convergence. Source: Goskomstat 
 
Testing for convergence among the 1/3 least productive 
 
  Absolute convergence bottom 1/3 
  
with Ingush Ingush dropped 
Obs 79 78 
R-squared 0.4911 0.0033 
  Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| 
lncind96 -0.22882 0.0440 0.0098 0.6990 
constant 0.716862 0.0260 0.0496 0.4540 
 
Table 5.6. Absolute Convergence bottom 1/3. Source Goskomstat 
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Testing for absolute convergence in the two periods up to 1998 and after 
Absolute convergence 1996-1998 
  
with Ingush Ingush dropped 
Obs 79 78 
R-squared 0.0996 0 
  Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| 
lncind96 -0.1024 0.27 0.0001 0.994 
constant 0.3773 0.235 0.0251 0.703 
Absolute convergence 1999-2004 
R-squared 0.0104 0.0003 
  Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| 
lncind96 -0.0118 0.4580 0.0017 0.8670 
constant 0.1336 0.0190 0.0847 0.0130 
 
Table A..5 7. Absolute Convergence in 1996 – 2004. Source Goskomstat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Robustness test of my results 
Regression: data deflated by CPI 
  with Ingush Ingush removed 
Obs 79 78 
R-squared 0.0100 0.0407 
  Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| 
lncind -0.0130 0.6900 0.0220 0.0750 
constant 0.1181 0.2850 -0.0018 0.9630 
Table A. 5 8.  CPI Regression. Source Goskomstat 
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6.6 Testing for conditional convergence 
 
Testing the importance of differentiated industrial structure 
Industrial structure 
Obs: 78 A3 
R-squared 0.1857 
R-squared adj 0.0500 
      
  Coefficient P>|t| 
Lncind -0.0139 0.3700 
Constant -0.0517 0.8790 
control variables     
sinv96 0.1123 0.0780 
El 0.0015 0.6530 
Fuel 0.0016 0.6330 
Petchem 0.0014 0.6640 
Machmet 0.0015 0.6370 
Timbcell 0.0035 0.3270 
Light 0.0016 0.6450 
Metal 0.0017 0.5990 
Constcer -0.0004 0.9090 
Foodgrain 0.0015 0.6730 
Table A.5.9. Industrial Structure. Source Goskomstat 
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Additional regressions on conditional convergence 
Conditional convergence 
Obs: 78 A1 A2 
R-squared 0.2182 0.3696 
R-squared adj 0.1639 0.3066   
  
        
  Coefficient P>|t|     
Lncind -0.0163 0.2330 -0.0273 0.0240 
Constant -0.0107 0.8120 0.1127 0.0020 
control variables         
investment share 0.1414 0.0120 0.0610 0.0310 
population growth -4.2616 0.0050     
education (prof) 0.0032 0.0850     
migration share 3.0674 0.0160     
FDI     0.0018 0.0020 
Trade     0.0869 0.0000 
Migration     -0.0007 0.0000 
SME         
share employed in R&D         
market potential     0.0000 0.0350 
Resourses 0.0007 0.0830 0.0003 0.5060 
Table A.5 10. Conditional Convergence. Source Goskomstat 
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6.7  Robustness test: Using Barro’s and Sala-i-Martin’s growth rate 
I have here calculated the growth rate following the method used by Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1991,1992). 
  
BSM1 BSM2 BSM3 
Obs 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.0024 0.1069 0.2941 
R-squared adj    0.0580 0.2007 
  
            
  Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| 
lncind -0.0038 0.5980 -0.0063 0.4320 -0.0224 0.0480 
constant 0.0663 0.0050 0.0272 0.5120 0.0819 0.0120 
control variables           
investment share    0.0953 0.0100 0.0710 0.0060 
population growth    -0.6685 0.2660    
education (prof)    0.0011 0.4760    
FDI/GRP        0.0013 0.0070 
trade/GRP        0.0302 0.0990 
Migration        -0.0007 0.0060 
SME        0.0002 0.1080 
share employed in R&D        0.2011 0.3070 
market potential        0.0000 0.0430 
resourses         0.0003 0.3800 
Table A. 5 11. Regression using Barro and Sala-i-Martin growth rate. Source Goskomstat 
 
 
